Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited and Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues under the Amended Federal Rules by Barnette, William P.
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 5
2012
Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited and
Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues under the
Amended Federal Rules
William P. Barnette
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
William P. Barnette, Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited and Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues under the Amended Federal Rules, 18
Rich. J.L. & Tech 11 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol18/iss3/5
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 1 
GHOST IN THE MACHINE:  ZUBULAKE REVISITED AND OTHER 
EMERGING E-DISCOVERY ISSUES UNDER THE  
AMENDED FEDERAL RULES 
 
 
By William P. Barnette* 
 
 
Cite as: William P. Barnette, Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited 
and Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues Under the Amended Federal 
Rules, XVIII Rich. J. L. & Tech. 11 (2012), http://jolt.richmo 
nd.edu/v18i3/article11.pdf. 
 
 
“I am all for your using machines, but do not let them use you.” 
Winston Churchill1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] We live in a digital age.2  Electronically stored information 
(“ESI”) “is commonplace in our personal lives and in the operation of 
                                                 
* William P. Barnette is Counsel—Commercial Litigation for The Home Depot.  His 
primary responsibility is managing the company’s class action and other complex 
commercial litigation.  Mr. Barnette publishes and lectures frequently on all aspects of 
complex and class action litigation, including issues related to e-discovery.  His most 
recent works were published in the Cleveland State Law Review and the University of 
Detroit Mercy Law Review.  The views expressed herein are the author’s alone. 
 
1 MARTIN GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: NEVER DESPAIR, 1945-1965 at 210 (Vol. 
VIII 1988). 
 
2 MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM 9 (2009) (“The history of the last hundred years 
has been, as much as anything else, the process of encoding information . . . . With binary 
coding, electrons as messengers, and the hard-fought mathematical adaptation necessary 
for control, we can now do almost everything in regard to information.  We may, for 
example, look through billions of pages in an instant . . . .”); see also BARBARA J. 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION:  A POCKET 
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businesses, public entities, and private organizations.”3  By now the 
numbers no longer shock:  “more than 90% of all corporate information is 
electronic;4 North American businesses exchange over 2.5 trillion e-mails 
per year;5 today, less than 1% of all communication will ever appear in 
paper form; and, on average, a 1000-person corporation will generate 
nearly 2 million e-mails annually.”6   
 
                                                                                                                         
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (Federal Judicial Center 2007) [hereinafter Pocket Guide], 
available at  http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf (“It 
is a fact of modern life that an enormous volume of information is created, exchanged, 
and stored electronically.”). 
 
3 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 1.  ESI “includes e-mails, webpages, word processing 
files, and databases stored in the memory of computers, magnetic disks (such as 
computer hard drives and floppy disks), optical disks (such as DVDs and CDs), and flash 
memory (such as ‘thumb’ or ‘flash’ drives).”  Id. at 2. 
 
4 Indeed, as early as 2002, 92% of new information was stored on magnetic media, 
primarily hard disks.  See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003, 
U. Cal. AT BERKELEY Sch. OF Inf. Mgmt. & Sys., http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/rese 
arch/projects/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
 
5 Id.  E-mail creates “about 400,000 terabytes of new information each year worldwide.”  
Id.  Meanwhile, instant messaging “generates 5 billion (750GB) messages a day, or 274 
terabytes a year.”  Id.  It is estimated that in 2009 some 247 billion e-mails were sent per 
day.  Stephen D. Brody et al., Zealous Advocacy and the Discovery Process: Does the 
Duty to Cooperate Leave Room for Lawyering After National Day Laborer?, 212 PLI/NY 
271, 275-76 (2011). 
 
6 Dale M. Cendali et al., Potential Ethical Pitfalls in Electronic Discovery, SM090 ALI-
ABA 1421, 1423 (2007) (citing Harvey L. Kaplan, Electronic Discovery in the 21st 
Century:  Is Help on the Way?, 733 PLI/LIT 65, 67 (2005)); see also Pocket Guide, supra 
note 2, at 3 (citing Microsoft, Survey Finds Workers Average Only Three Productive 
Days Per Week, (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/mar05 
/0315ThreeProductiveDaysPr.mspx) (“[The] average employee sends or receives about 
50 messages per working day”). 
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[2] Not surprisingly, then, in the last several years discovery has 
increasingly focused on e-mail and other ESI.7  Where electronic 
discovery was once present “only in large cases involving sophisticated 
entities, it is now seen in routine civil cases and in many criminal cases.”8  
Relatedly, the costs associated with e-discovery have continued to 
increase.9  For instance, as of 2009 one leading e-discovery consultant 
estimated that overall industry costs would grow 20% over the previous 
year and exceed $4 billion.10   
 
[3] In an individual matter, the “effort and expense associated with 
electronic discovery [is] so excessive that, regardless of a case’s merits, 
settlement is often the most fiscally prudent course.”11  Indeed, “[o]ne 
purpose of discovery—improper and rarely acknowledged but pervasive—
is:  ‘it makes one’s opponent spend money.’”12  ESI exacerbates the 
                                                 
7 See Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 1 (“In the past decade, discovery involving word-
processed documents, spreadsheets, e-mail, and other [ESI] has become more routine. . . 
.”). 
 
8 Id. 
 
9 John Bace, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew Justice System, GARTNER RES., Apr. 
20, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.akershaw.com/Documents/co 
st_of_ediscovery_threatens_148170.pdf (“The volumes and costs associated with 
meeting e-discovery requests are rising precipitously.”); see also The Sedona Conference, 
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (Supp. 
2009) [hereinafter Cooperation Proclamation] (“The costs associated with adversarial 
conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious burden to the American judicial 
system.  This burden rises significantly in discovery of [ESI].”). 
 
10 Jason Krause, EDD Providers Adapt to a Down Economy, L. TECH. NEWS, Oct. 12, 
2009 (citing George Socha, a producer of the Socha-Gelbmann industry survey in 2009). 
 
11 John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 550 (2010); see also Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, 
at 2 (“[Discovery costs] often overshadow efforts to resolve the matter itself.”). 
 
12 Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK § 4.5, 115-16 
(2010)).  
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impact of this improper purpose.13  Corporate defendants largely bear the 
expense of such abusive discovery tactics, particularly in complex 
litigation such as class actions in which their conduct is the “focus of the 
litigation.”14       
 
[4] With the increasing prevalence and cost of e-discovery, there has 
been a corresponding rise in ESI-related disputes.15  Such disputes and 
their inherent expense can lead to decisions based on “questions of process 
rather than merit.”16  Indeed, “e-discovery has become more than merely a 
discovery process; it has become an alternate method of trying a 
lawsuit.”17  Perhaps predictably, given that they more often respond to 
discovery requests, rather than initiate them, “[d]efendants are sanctioned 
for e-discovery violations nearly three times more often than plaintiffs.”18  
But, sanctions can be equal opportunity destroyers: while in aggregate 
                                                 
13 Id. at 849-50  (“[V]ast and ever-expanding volume of [e-mails] has made the cost of 
discovery soar.”).  
 
14 Id. (noting adverse “asymmetry . . . [that] there is far more evidence that plaintiffs may 
be able to discover in defendants’ records . . . than vice versa”). 
 
15 Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, at 1 (“In addition to rising monetary costs, 
courts have seen escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and extensive, but 
unproductive discovery disputes . . . .”). 
 
16 Bace, supra note 9, at 1; Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining that 
discovery disputes may preclude “adjudication on the merits altogether”); Larry H. 
Kunin, Appreciate the New Merits of E-Discovery, DAILY REPORT, Jan. 26, 2009, at 1 
(“[T]he quest for examination of all ESI and/or sanctions . . . is often leading to improper 
discovery requests and runaway litigation costs.”). 
 
17 Kunin, supra note 16, at 2; see In re Ebay Seller Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01882 JF 
(RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75498, *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007) (noting motion for 
interim preservation order related “solely to ‘discovery about discovery’”).  
 
18 Dan H. Willoughby et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 
DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010). 
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defendants have suffered more for ESI-related discovery abuses, a number 
of plaintiffs have also paid the price.19  
 
[5] Effective December 1, 2006, Congress amended the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in an attempt to “deal with the most basic problems 
associated with the discovery of [ESI].”20  After five years of case law 
interpreting the amendments, some trends are evident21—unfortunately, 
these trends increasingly conflict with Rule 1’s mandate that the Federal 
Rules be “administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action . . . .”22  This article will examine the impact 
of the amendments on the discovery of ESI and assess whether they have 
been effective in dealing with the “basic problems” of such discovery.23   
 
[6] The article will begin with a discussion of significant pre-
amendment decisions relating to the preservation and production of ESI.24  
It will then assess the recent amendments to the Federal Rules and how 
these have affected parties’ discovery obligations.25 The article will focus 
on key issues that have arisen in the five years the amendments have been 
in effect, such as the duty to preserve ESI and when it arises, the scope of 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., 
LLC, No. 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010).  
This phenomenon has led some commentators to divide the world into “data requesters 
versus data producers,” as opposed to plaintiffs or defendants.  Symposium, Managing 
Electronic Discovery: Views From the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) 
(comments by Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal). 
 
20 Bace, supra note 9, at 2. 
 
21 See infra Section IV. 
 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 
23 Bace, supra note 9, at 2. 
 
24 See infra Section II. 
 
25 See infra Section III. 
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the preservation duty and the form of production, including privilege 
issues, and the sanctions that have been awarded based on the failure to 
preserve and produce relevant ESI.26  Finally, the article will discuss a 
critical emerging issue related to the methodology for identifying and 
locating ESI, namely the sufficiency of keyword searches versus various 
other alternatives.27  Given the need for expert involvement and the 
associated increase in cost, combined with the real world limitations on 
the ability of cooperation to control costs, the article concludes that it 
remains an open question whether the benefits of expanded e-discovery 
under the amended Federal Rules outweigh the burdens on the civil justice 
system.28 
 
II. KEY PRE-AMENDMENT DECISIONS REGARDING THE 
PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF ESI 
 
[7] While commentators have viewed the amendments to the Federal 
Rules as ushering in a sea change in discovery,29 in reality, case law 
before 2006 increasingly recognized the discoverability of, and the 
corresponding duty to preserve, ESI.30  Thus, a number of the significant 
                                                 
26 See infra Section IV. 
 
27 See infra Section IV.D. 
 
28 See infra Section V. 
 
29 E.g. Sharon Nelson & John Simek, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An ESI 
Primer, 32 NO. 8 LAW PRAC. 23, 25 (2006). 
 
30 See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 
2002) (“It is a well accepted proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be e-
mails or otherwise, are discoverable.”); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 
2001) (“During discovery, the producing party has an obligation to search available 
electronic systems for the information demanded.”); Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, 
Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (noting “computer records, including records 
that have been ‘deleted,’ are documents discoverable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34”); Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. Civ. A. No. 69-C-58-D, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16355,  *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (“The law is clear that data in computerized form is 
discoverable even if paper ‘hard copies’ of the information have been produced, and that 
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issues that have arisen under the revised Federal Rules, such as the duty 
and scope of preservation, cost-shifting, and spoliation sanctions, 
originated in pre-amendment cases.31 
 
A. Rowe—Cost-Shifting Factors 
 
[8] In one leading early e-discovery case, Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. 
The William Morris Agency, Inc., certain defendants sought a protective 
order against the production of e-mail stored on backup tapes.32  
Reasoning that “[e]lectronic documents are no less subject to disclosure 
than paper records,”33 the court denied the requested protective order.34   
 
[9] The court further recognized, however, that “discovery is not just 
about uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the 
                                                                                                                         
the producing party can be required to design a computer program to extract the data 
from its computerized business records, subject to the Court’s discretion as to the 
allocation of the costs of designing such a computer program.”); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 
108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (“[N]ow axiomatic that [ESI] is discoverable,” if 
relevant); Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 222 (W.D. Va. 1972) (granting 
motion to compel payroll records in “the appropriate computerized form”). 
 
31 See infra Section II.A-III. 
 
32 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y 
2002). The plaintiffs were concert promoters who alleged defendants used discriminatory 
and anti-competitive practices to prevent plaintiffs from promoting certain events.  Id. 
 
33 Id. at 428; see also Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. 
Cal. 1999); Daewoo Elec. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1986). 
 
34 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433.  Defendants argued the e-mail was not likely to yield relevant 
information because any such significant communications would have been printed out 
and placed in appropriate files, which had already been provided to plaintiffs.  Id. at 428.  
The court rejected this contention, noting studies that conclude one-third of all e-mail is 
never printed out.  Id. 
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parties can afford to disinter.”35  Thus, on the “more difficult issue”36 of 
who should pay for the production, the court ordered that plaintiffs would 
bear the cost.37  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the parties’ 
competing bright-line rules, which each suggested that the other should 
pay.38   
 
[10] Plaintiffs contended the “responding party should bear the costs of 
producing electronic data since ‘if a party chooses an electronic storage 
method, the necessity for a retrieval program is an ordinary and 
foreseeable risk.’”39  Noting the principle relied on by the plaintiffs did 
“not translate well into the realm of electronic data,” the court recognized 
that because storage costs for ESI “are virtually nil,” there could simply be 
“no compelling reason to discard it.”40  Likewise, the court reasoned that 
                                                 
35 Id. at 423.  According to the court, the case illustrated how “discovery expenses 
frequently escalate when information is stored in electronic form.”  Id.  In particular, the 
court recognized the “expense of locating and extracting [the] responsive e-mails is 
substantial . . . .”  Id. at 428.  Indeed, while disputed by plaintiffs, each defendant put on 
evidence that the production costs would range from the tens of thousands of dollars to 
almost $9.75 million for a single defendant.  Id. at 425-28. 
 
36 Id. at 428.  
 
37 Id. at 432-33.  The court recognized that to prevent “undue burden or expense,” it could 
“[shift] some or all of the costs of the production to the requesting party.”  Id. at 428.  But 
traditionally, the “presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests . . . .”  Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 358 (1978).   
 
38 Id. at 429. 
 
39 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 
Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) and 
Daewoo Elec. Ltd. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986) (“The 
normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the discovering 
party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in the absence of a 
showing of extraordinary hardship.”)). 
 
40 Id. 
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even when subject data is retained for “limited [business] purposes, it is 
not necessarily amenable to discovery.”41  In particular, according to the 
court, “[b]ack-up tapes . . . ‘are not archives from which documents may 
easily be retrieved.  The data on a backup tape are not organized for 
retrieval of individual documents or files, but for wholesale, emergency 
uploading onto a computer system.’”42    
 
[11] Similarly, the court rejected defendants’ argument that the 
requesting party should bear the expense.43  Defendants contended that 
“when the costs of discovery are internalized, [the requesting] party can 
perform a cost-benefit analysis and decide whether the effort is 
justified,”44 making cost-shifting appropriate.  According to the court, this 
position failed for two reasons:  (1) it conflicted with the “well-established 
legal principle . . . that the responding party will pay the expenses of 
production”; and (2) it could “result in the abandonment of meritorious 
claims by litigants too poor to pay for necessary discovery.”45  
 
[12] In lieu of applying a bright-line rule, the court balanced eight 
different factors:  (1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the 
likelihood of discovering relevant information; (3) the availability of the 
information elsewhere; (4) the purposes for which the responding party 
maintains the subject data; (5) the relative benefit to the parties of 
obtaining the information; (6) the total cost of the production; (7) the 
relative ability and incentive of each party to control costs; and (8) each 
party’s resources.46  Finding that the factors “tip[ped] heavily in favor of 
                                                 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. (quoting Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil 
Litigation, SF97 ALI-ABA 1079, 1085 (2001)). 
 
43 Id.  
 
44 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429. 
 
45 Id.; see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
 
46 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429. 
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shifting”47 the production costs to plaintiffs, the court noted the requests 
were “extremely broad,”48 the overall expense was “substantial by any 
definition,”49 and plaintiffs were best situated to control the costs.50   
 
[13] Further, the court reasoned that the concept of “marginal utility” 
favored shifting the costs to plaintiffs.51  That is, while a broad search of 
the subject e-mails should not be precluded altogether, the court assessed 
there had “certainly been no showing that the e-mails [were] likely to be a 
gold mine.”52  Thus, because the “marginal value of searching the e-mails 
[was] modest at best,” this factor supported shifting the cost to plaintiffs.53  
Likewise, the “absence of any benefit to the defendants” from the 
production justified cost-shifting.54   
 
[14] In addition, the court noted there was no evidence defendants ever 
accessed “either their back-up tapes or their deleted e-mails in the normal 
                                                 
47 Id. at 432. 
 
48 Id. at 430.  According to the court, “[w]here a party multiplies litigation costs by 
seeking expansive rather than targeted discovery, that party should bear the expense.”  Id. 
 
49 Id. at 431.  Where the “total cost of the requested discovery is not substantial, . . . there 
is no cause to deviate from the presumption that the responding party will bear the 
expense.”  Id. 
 
50 Id. at 432 (recognizing it is “more efficient to place the burden on the party that will 
decide how expansive the discovery will be”).  
 
51 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at, 430. 
 
52 Id. 
 
53 Id.; see McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[The] more likely it is 
that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer 
it is that the [responding party] search at its own expense.  The less likely it is, the more 
unjust it would be to make [the responding party] search at its own expense.  The 
difference is ‘at the margin.’”). 
 
54 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431 (“Where the responding party itself benefits from the 
production, there is less rationale for shifting costs to the requesting party”). 
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course of business . . . .”55  Thus, as “a party would not be required to sort 
through its trash to resurrect discarded paper documents,” in the court’s 
view it likewise would “not be obligated to pay the cost of retrieving 
deleted e-mails.”56   
 
[15] The court established a protocol for production, which the parties 
were free to modify by agreement.57  Interestingly, the protocol contained 
essentially a clawback provision to deal with the inadvertent production of 
privileged documents, an issue which was later addressed in the 
amendments to the Federal Rules.58 
 
B. Zubulake I—Cost-Shifting Factors Revised 
 
[16] On the heels of Rowe59 came Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 
(Zubulake I), which built upon and somewhat modified the Rowe 
principles, resulting in a series of landmark e-discovery rulings.  In 
                                                 
55 Id. at 431.   
 
56 Id.  But see id. at 430-32.  The remaining factors were more of a mixed bag.  For 
instance, the court concluded there was no showing the e-mails in question were 
“generally available other than by a search of the defendants’ hard drives or back-up 
tapes,” which supported defendants’ bearing the cost of the production.  Id. at 430.  The 
court further determined the relative resources of the parties to be neutral.  Id. at 432. 
 
57 Id. at 433.  Plaintiff’s counsel was required to create a search procedure to identify 
responsive e-mails and notify “defendants’ counsel of the procedure chosen, including 
any specific word searches.”  Defendants could object to any search proposed.  Id. 
 
58 Id. at 433.  The protocol anticipated that a privilege review of the e-mails would not 
occur until after plaintiffs ran the search and identified any documents they considered 
responsive.  Any defendant that elected to review its database prior to production had to 
do so at its own cost.  See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text for further 
discussion of such “clawback” provisions.   
 
59 The Rowe ruling was issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Francis.  Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 
423.  Plaintiffs objected to the ruling and moved to set aside the portion of the order 
shifting costs.  Their motion was denied.  Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris 
Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 (RPP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8308, at *3, *32-33 
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2002).   
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Zubulake I, plaintiff alleged various claims arising out of gender 
discrimination and retaliation.60  She contended “key evidence” existed in 
e-mails contained only on backup tapes.61  In opposition to plaintiff’s 
motion to compel production of the e-mails, defendants argued that 
restoring them would cost approximately $175,000 and thus be unduly 
burdensome.62   
 
[17] The court began by noting that like paper records, electronic 
documents are subject to discovery, including those “documents that may 
have been deleted and now reside only on backup disks.”63  Thus, plaintiff 
was entitled to discovery of the subject e-mails as long as they were 
relevant, which the court found they clearly were.64  Turning to the issue 
of cost-shifting, the court rejected the notion that “cost-shifting must be 
considered in every case involving the discovery of electronic data . . . .”65  
                                                 
60 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
The court characterized plaintiff’s claims as “certainly not frivolous,” noting one 
“smoking gun” piece of evidence that had already been discovered:  “an e-mail 
suggesting that she be fired ‘ASAP’ after her EEOC charge was filed, in part so that she 
would not be eligible for year-end bonuses.”  Id. at 311, 312 n.8.  Indeed, plaintiff 
ultimately won a verdict totaling $9.1 million in compensatory damages, plus $20.1 
million in punitive damages.  Eduard Porter, UBS Ordered to Pay $29 Million in Sex Bias 
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2005, at C4. 
 
61 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311-12.  “[E]-mail was an important means of 
communication at [the defendant’s workplace] during the relevant time period,” with 
each salesperson receiving approximately 200 e-mails a day.  Id. at 313-14.  While 
defendant initially produced approximately 100 pages of e-mail messages, plaintiff 
herself produced approximately 450 pages.  Id. at 313.  The e-mails in dispute were 
stored on 94 backup tapes.  Id. at 317.  
 
62 Id. at 312.  While defendant claimed that its production was “complete,” it obviously 
had not searched for responsive e-mails on any of the backup tapes.  Id. at 313, 317 
(“[Defendant] cannot represent that it has produced all responsive e-mails.”). 
 
63 Id. at 317. 
 
64 Id.   
 
65 Id.  
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Rather, according to the court, any “principled approach to electronic 
evidence must respect” the presumption that the responding party bears 
the expense of answering discovery requests.66  The court admonished that 
“cost-shifting may effectively end discovery, especially when private 
parties are engaged in litigation with large corporations.”67  Accordingly, 
the court concluded that “cost-shifting should be considered only when 
electronic discovery imposes an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the 
responding party.”68  A burden or expense is undue when it “‘outweighs 
its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving 
the issues.’”69 
 
[18] Continuing, the court reasoned that whether “production of 
documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether 
it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format (a distinction that 
corresponds closely to the expense of production).”70  And the question of 
whether “electronic data is accessible or inaccessible turns largely on the 
media on which it is stored.”71  To illustrate, the court discussed five 
categories of data and their storage:  (1) active, online data;72 (2) near-line 
                                                 
66 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317; see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 
358 (1978). 
 
67 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317-18 (“[F]requent use of cost-shifting will have the effect 
of crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases.”). 
 
68 Id. at 318.  The court characterized the assumption that an “undue burden or expense 
may arise simply because electronic evidence is involved” as “mak[ing] no sense.”  Id. 
 
69 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)). 
 
70 Id. at 318. 
 
71 Id.   
 
72 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.  The prototypical example of online data is information 
on hard drives.  Id. 
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data;73 (3) offline storage/archives;74 (4) backup tapes;75 and (5) erased, 
fragmented or damaged data.76  According to the court, the “first three 
categories are typically identified as accessible, and the latter two as 
inaccessible.”77  The distinction between the two categories “is easy to 
appreciate.  Information deemed ‘accessible’ is stored in a readily usable 
format . . . . ‘Inaccessible’ data, on the other hand, is not readily usable.”78 
 
[19] Applying these principles, the court concluded the e-mails on the 
ninety-four backup tapes were not “currently accessible.”79  Because 
defendant would have to engage in a “costly and time-consuming process” 
to search the subject e-mails, the court found it “appropriate to consider 
cost-shifting.”80  The court recognized that the Rowe eight factor test had 
“become the gold standard” for cost-shifting analysis.81  Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
73 Id. at 318-19.  Optical disks are good examples of near-line data storage devices.  Id. 
 
74 Id. at 319.  Offline data “lacks ‘the coordinated control of an intelligent disk 
subsystem,’” and is often referred to as “JBOD (‘Just a Bunch of Disks’).”  Id.   
 
75 Id. at 319.  Data on backup tapes “are not organized for retrieval of individual 
documents or files . . . .”  Id. 
 
76 Id.  Erased data “can only be accessed after significant processing.”  Id. 
 
77 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20. 
 
78 Id. at 320.  The court noted the “accessible/inaccessible test employed” by it was “very 
similar” to the “active data” versus “residual data,” i.e., “deleted, shadowed, [or] 
fragmented” data, distinction drawn by the Sedona Conference.  Id. at 320 n.61. 
 
79 Id. at 320. 
 
80 Id. 
 
81 Id. 
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court found the Rowe test was “incomplete”82 and, as a result, “generally 
favor[ed] cost-shifting.”83  
 
[20] First, the court noted that Rule 26 “requires consideration ‘of the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in 
resolving the issues.’”84  But Rowe made “no mention of either the amount 
in controversy or the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.”85  
The court thus concluded these factors “should be added” to balance out 
the “Rowe factor that typically weighs most heavily in favor of cost-
shifting, ‘the total cost associated with production.’”86   
 
[21] Next, the court reasoned that the “absolute wealth of the parties is 
not the relevant factor.”87  Thus, Rowe’s reference to the “resources 
available to each party” was immaterial, according to the court.88  Instead, 
                                                 
82 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 320.  In addition, the court was troubled by the fact that 
“courts have given equal weight to all of the [Rowe] factors, when certain factors should 
predominate.”  Id.  
 
83 Id.  As evidence, the court noted that “of the handful of reported opinions that apply 
Rowe or some modification thereof, all of them have ordered [cost-shifting].”  Id.; see, 
e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564 Section “T”(1), 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3196 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002). 
 
84 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)). 
 
85 Id. at 321. 
 
86 Id.  As the court noted, while production costs are typically “objectively large” in any 
case where cost-shifting is an issue, that cost when compared to the “amount in 
controversy” may shed revealing light on the significance of the discovery in the context 
of the overall litigation.  Id.  For instance, a “response to a discovery request costing 
$100,000 sounds (and is) costly, but in a case potentially worth millions of dollars, the 
cost of responding may not be unduly burdensome.”  Id.  
 
87 Id. 
 
88 Id.  
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the “focus should be on the total cost of production as compared to the 
resources available to each party.”89   
 
[22] Finally, the court considered the “‘importance of the issues at stake 
in the litigation’ . . . a critical consideration, even if rarely invoked.”90   To 
illustrate, in the court’s view “if a case has the potential for broad public 
impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of permitting extensive 
discovery.”91   
 
[23] The court furthered its modification of Rowe by eliminating two 
factors.92  First, the court deleted Rowe’s reliance on “the specificity of 
the discovery request,” considering this to be essentially redundant of the 
relevance and cost factors.93  Consequently, the court settled on a factor 
combining those elements, which would simply examine the “extent to 
                                                 
89 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (emphasis added).  In other words, “discovery that 
would be too expensive for one defendant to bear [may] be a drop in the bucket for 
another.”  Id. (citing defendant’s net profits of $716 million for the third quarter of 2002 
alone). 
 
90 Id. 
  
91 Id.  Of course, the question of who should bear the cost of such discovery is separate 
and apart from whether the discovery should be permitted in the first place. In any event, 
as examples of such “public impact” cases, the court cited “toxic tort class actions, 
environmental actions, . . . social reform litigation, cases involving criminal conduct, or 
cases implicating important legal or constitutional questions.”  Id.  
 
92 Id. 
 
93 Id.  In this regard, the court acknowledged that “[s]pecificity is surely the touchstone of 
any good discovery request, requiring a party to frame a request broadly enough to obtain 
relevant evidence, yet narrowly enough to control costs.”  Id.; see WORKING GRP. ON 
ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION at ii (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2007) (Principle 4:  “Discovery requests should make as clear as possible what electronic 
documents and data are being asked for, while responses and objections to discovery 
should disclose the scope and limits of what is being produced.”). 
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which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant 
information.”94   
 
[24] In addition, the court found Rowe’s reliance on “the purposes for 
which the responding party maintains the requested data” to be “typically 
unimportant.”95  On the contrary, according to the court, “[w]hether the 
data is kept for a business purpose or for disaster recovery does not affect 
its accessibility, which is the practical basis for calculating the cost of 
production.”96  Thus, “[a]lthough a business purpose will often coincide 
with accessibility—data that is inaccessible is unlikely to be used or 
needed in the ordinary course of business—the concepts are not 
coterminous.”97  Indeed, a “good deal of accessible, easily produced 
material may be kept for no apparent business purpose.”98  But “[s]uch 
evidence is no less discoverable than paper documents that serve no 
current purpose and exist only because a party failed to discard them.”99   
 
[25] After trimming and shaping the Rowe factors, the Zubulake court 
arrived at a new seven-factor test:   
 
(1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to 
discover relevant information; (2) the availability of such 
information from other sources; (3) the total cost of the 
production, compared to the amount in controversy; (4) the 
                                                 
94 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321. 
 
95 Id. 
 
96 Id. 
 
97 Id. at 321-22. 
 
98 Id. at 322 n. 68.   
 
99 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322 n. 68.  For example, data that should “have been erased 
pursuant to a document retention/destruction policy may have been inadvertently 
retained.  If so, the fact that it should have been erased in no way shields that data from 
discovery.”  Id. at 322. 
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total cost of the production, compared to the resources 
available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each party 
to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) 
the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information.100  
 
[26] Significantly, the court determined the seven factors should not be 
weighed equally.101  Rather, in the court’s view the “central question must 
be, does the request impose an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the 
responding party?”102  The court resolved that “[w]eighting the factors in 
descending order of importance” may answer this question.103  Thus, the 
court concluded that the first two factors—the extent to which the request 
is tailored to discover relevant information, and the availability of such 
information from other sources —“are the most important.”104   
 
[27] The next most significant set of factors, numbers three through 
five, address “cost issues,” i.e., “‘How expensive will this production be?’ 
and, ‘Who can handle that expense?’”105  Descending further in 
importance, the court came to factor six: the importance of the litigation 
itself.106  Interestingly, while acknowledging that this factor “will only 
rarely come into play,” the court stated that it had “the potential to 
                                                 
100 Id. at 322. 
 
101 Id. at 322-23 (noting the “temptation to treat the factors as a check-list,” but 
recognizing that the “test cannot be mechanically applied at the risk of losing sight of its 
purpose”). 
 
102 Id. (“Put another way, ‘how important is the sought-after evidence in comparison to 
the cost of production?’”). 
 
103 Id. at 323. 
 
104 Zubulake I,  217 F.R.D. at 323.   
 
105 Id. 
 
106 Id. 
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predominate over the others.”107  Factor seven—the relative benefits to 
each party of the production—brought up the rear.108  According to the 
court, this factor was “least important because it is fair to presume that the 
response to a discovery request generally benefits the requesting party.”109 
 
[28] Having established the revised cost-shifting test and the relative 
weight to be accorded each of the seven factors, the court turned its 
attention to the evidence needed to analyze each factor.110  The court 
criticized Rowe’s assumption that the requested e-mails were unlikely to 
be a “gold mine,”111 reasoning that “such proof will rarely exist in 
advance of obtaining the requested discovery.”112  Rather than speculating 
or making assumptions, the court determined that examining a small 
sample of backup tapes would “inform the cost-shifting analysis . . . .”113  
Such “tangible evidence” would reveal “what the backup tapes may have 
to offer,” as well as the “time and cost required to restore” them.114  The 
court thus ordered defendant to “produce, at its expense, responsive e-
mails from any five backup tapes selected” by plaintiff.115  Defendant 
would then provide an affidavit detailing “the results of its search, as well 
                                                 
107 Id. 
 
108 Id. 
 
109 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323.  In the “unusual case where production will also 
provide a tangible or strategic benefit to the responding party, that fact may weigh 
against shifting costs.”  Id. 
 
110 Id. 
 
111 Id. (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430). 
 
112 Id.  In the court’s view, assumptions regarding the likelihood that relevant information 
would be found led Rowe and subsequent cases to favor cost-shifting “uniformly.”  Id. 
 
113 Id. at 324. 
 
114 Zubulake I,  217 F.R.D. at 324. 
 
115 Id.  The defendant was also ordered to produce at its expense all e-mails that existed 
on accessible sources, i.e., on its optical disks or its active servers.  Id. 
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as the time and money spent.”116  The court could then “conduct the 
appropriate cost-shifting analysis.”117  
 
C. Zubulake III—Cost-Shifting Applied 
 
[29] A keyword search of the five backup tapes selected by plaintiff 
resulted in 1,075 responsive e-mails.118   Defendant deemed 600 of these 
responsive to plaintiff’s document request and produced them.119  Plaintiff 
presented the court with sixety-eight of the e-mails which she claimed 
were “highly relevant.”120  In Zubulake III, the court used this “factual 
basis” to perform the cost-shifting analysis under the seven factors it had 
previously enunciated.121  The court began by noting the party responding 
to the discovery at issue “has the burden of proof on a motion for cost-
shifting.”122  Looking at the first two factors, which make up the 
“marginal utility test,”123 the court reasoned that plaintiff’s was “a 
                                                 
116 Id. 
 
117 Id. 
 
118 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
“The total cost of restoring and producing responsive e-mails from the five backup tapes 
was $19,003.43.”  Id. at 283.  Defendant estimated that the cost of further production 
from the backup tapes would be $273,649.39, including $165,954.67 “to restore and 
search the tapes and $107,694.72 in attorney and paralegal review costs.”  Id. 
 
119 Id. at 282. 
 
120 Id. at 285.  The court presumed the sixty-eight e-mails were “reasonably 
representative” of those contained on the seventy-seven backup tapes.  Id. 
 
121 Id. at 282, 284.  The court “emphasiz[ed] again that cost-shifting is potentially 
appropriate only when inaccessible data is sought.”  Id. at 284. 
 
122 Id. at 283.   
 
123 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 284.  The marginal utility test examines whether the 
request is “specifically tailored to discover relevant information” and the “availability of 
such information from other sources.”  Id.  The court emphasized that these two factors 
“should be weighted the most heavily in the cost-shifting analysis.”  Id.  
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relatively limited and targeted request,” which uncovered “relevant” and, 
indeed, “compelling” evidence.124   
 
[30] On the second half of the test—the “availability of the relevant 
data from other sources”125—the court reached the “unavoidable 
conclusion that there are a significant number of responsive e-mails that 
now exist only on backup tapes.”126  In so concluding, the court reasoned 
defendant had “previously produced only 100 pages of e-mails, but has 
now produced 853 pages (comprising the 600 responsive e-mails) from the 
five selected backup tapes alone.”127  Thus, the court ruled the marginal 
utility of restoring the remaining backup tapes was “potentially high.”128  
Given that defendant bore the burden on the motion, the court concluded 
that “the marginal utility test tip[ped] slightly against cost-shifting.”129   
 
[31] The court next looked at the “cost issues” in factors three through 
five—namely “How expensive will this production be?’ and, ‘Who can 
handle that expense?’”130  The court noted the stakes were well beyond the 
realm of an ordinary dispute.131  Rather, the court assumed the potential 
                                                 
124 Id. at 285.  In the court’s view, the e-mails painted a picture of the “dysfunctional 
atmosphere surrounding” plaintiff’s workplace.  Id.  In particular, the court noted a 
“number of the e-mails complain[ed] of [plaintiff’s] behavior.”  Id.    
   
125 Id. at 286. 
 
126 Id. at 287. 
 
127 Id. at 286-87. 
 
128 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 287.  None of the e-mails provided direct evidence of 
discrimination.  Id. at 286.  Because the existence of such direct evidence remained 
“speculative,” the court termed the marginal utility only “potentially” high.  Id. at 287.   
 
129 Id. at 287. 
 
130 Id.  
 
131 Id. at 288.  In an ordinary case, a “responding party should not be required to pay for 
the restoration of inaccessible data if the cost . . . is significantly disproportionate to the 
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exposure to be in the “multi-million dollar” range.132  Accordingly, the 
court determined the cost of the restoration was “surely not ‘significantly 
disproportionate’ to the projected value of [the] case,” and thus weighed 
against cost-shifting.133 
 
[32] Comparing the total cost of the production to each party’s 
resources, the court recognized there was “no question that [defendant] 
has exponentially more resources available to it than [plaintiff].”134  On 
the other hand, it was “not unheard of for plaintiff’s [sic] firms to front 
huge expenses when multi-million dollar recoveries are in sight.”135  Thus, 
in the court’s view, the resources available to each party weighed against 
cost-shifting, but did “not rule it out.”136 
 
[33] Regarding each party’s ability and incentive to control costs, the 
court concluded that plaintiff could do nothing more to “focus her 
discovery request or reduce its cost.”137  Likewise, defendant had control 
over selecting which outside vendor to restore the tapes but, once that 
selection was made, “costs [were] not within the control of either 
party.”138  Accordingly, the court characterized this factor as “neutral.”139 
                                                                                                                         
value of the case.”  Id.  But, according to the court, “[w]hatever else might be said, this is 
not a nuisance value case, a small case or a frivolous case.”  Id.   
 
132 Id.  In fact, the court reasoned that if plaintiff prevailed, her “damages award 
undoubtedly [would] be higher than that of the vast majority of Title VII plaintiffs.”  Id. 
 
133 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 288. 
 
134 Id.  
 
135 Id. 
 
136 Id. 
 
137 Id. 
 
138 Zubulake III,  216 F.R.D. at 288. 
 
139 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 23 
[34] Similarly, the court considered factor six—the importance of the 
issues at stake in the case—to be “neutral” as well.140  On the seventh and 
final factor, the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information, the court noted that plaintiff stood “to gain far more than 
[defendant], as will typically be the case.”141  This factor “weigh[ed] in 
favor of cost-shifting.”142 
 
[35] Tallying the factors, the court stressed that the outcome was “not 
merely a matter of counting and adding; [the factors are] only a guide.”143  
To illustrate, the court noted that “some of the factors cut against cost-
shifting, but only slightly so . . . .”144  Thus, the court concluded “some 
cost-shifting [was] appropriate . . . although [defendant] should pay the 
majority of the costs.”145  Acknowledging that the “precise allocation of 
costs is a matter of judgment and fairness rather than a mathematical 
consequence of the seven factors,” the court nevertheless held that the 
factors informed its “exercise of discretion.”146  Ultimately, the court 
assigned the “lion’s share” of the restoration costs, seventy-five percent, to 
                                                 
140 Id. at 289.  The court recognized that while “discrimination in the workplace” is a 
“weighty issue,” it is “hardly unique.”  Id. 
 
141 Id. 
 
142 Id.   
 
143 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289.  The court summarized that “[f]actors one through 
four tip against cost-shifting (although factor two only slightly so).  Factors five and six 
are neutral, and factor seven favors cost-shifting.”  Id.   
 
144 Id. 
 
145 Id.  In support of this conclusion, the court recognized there was “plainly relevant 
evidence that [was] only available on [defendant’s] backup tapes.”  Id.  Plaintiff, 
however, had “not been able to show that there [was] indispensable evidence on those 
backup tapes . . . .”  Id.   
 
146 Id. 
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defendant, while the remaining twenty-five percent were shifted to 
plaintiff.147   
 
D. Zubulake IV—Spoliation Sanctions 
 
[36] Subsequently, it came to light that certain of the backup tapes 
containing the requested e-mails had been destroyed.148  In Zubulake IV, 
the court considered plaintiff’s motion for sanctions149 arising out of this 
spoliation.150  According to the court, the questions presented involved 
“how to determine an appropriate penalty for the party that caused the loss 
[of evidence] and—the flip side—how to determine an appropriate remedy 
for the party injured by the loss.”151  Thus, the court addressed “both the 
scope of a litigant’s duty to preserve electronic documents and the 
                                                 
147 Id.  The court further ruled that defendant would exclusively bear any and all costs 
beyond restoring the tapes.  Id. at 291.  According to the court, as “a general rule, where 
cost-shifting is appropriate, only the costs of restoration and searching should be shifted.”  
Id. at 290.  That is, the “responding party should always bear the cost of reviewing and 
producing electronic data once it has been converted to an accessible form.”  Id.  
 
148 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
Specifically, six tapes and part of a seventh were missing.  Id. at 219. 
 
149 Id. at 215-16.  Plaintiff requested three sanctions:  “(a) an order requiring [defendant] 
to pay in full the costs of restoring the remainder of the monthly backup tapes; (b) an 
adverse inference instruction against [defendant] with respect to the backup tapes that 
[were] missing; and (c) an order directing [defendant] to bear the costs of re-deposing 
certain individuals” regarding recently produced e-mails.  Id. 
 
150 Id. “Spoliation is ‘the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to 
preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable 
litigation.’” Id. at 216 (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 
(2d Cir. 1999)).  Spoliation of “evidence germane ‘to proof of an issue at trial can support 
an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for 
its destruction.’”  Id. (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 
1998)).  The levying of an appropriate sanction for spoliation, however, is “confined to 
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and is assessed on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. 
(quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 
151 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 214. 
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consequences of a failure to preserve documents that fall within the scope 
of that duty.”152        
 
[37] Before reaching the scope of the duty to preserve, the court 
recognized that “a party can only be sanctioned for destroying evidence if 
it had a duty to preserve it” in the first instance.153  The court thus 
examined both “when” defendant’s duty to preserve attached and “what” 
evidence should have been preserved.154  On the first question, the court 
noted the “obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice 
that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have 
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”155  Applying 
this principle, the court recognized that defendant’s duty to preserve arose 
no later than August 2001, when plaintiff filed her EEOC charge.156  But 
the court went further, finding that the duty actually attached in April of 
2001 when all of defendant’s “key players” anticipated litigation.157  
 
[38] Turning to the scope of the preservation duty, the court rejected the 
notion that a party must maintain “every shred of paper, every e-mail or 
electronic document . . . .”158  Consequently, as a general rule, “a party 
                                                 
152 Id.   
 
153 Id. at 216.  Thus, if defendant “had no such duty, then [it] cannot be faulted.”  Id. 
 
154 Id. 
 
155 Id.; see Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126 (preservation duty arises “when a party should have 
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation”); cf. Arthur Andersen LLP 
v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (Ordinarily, it is “not wrongful for a manager 
to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document retention policy . . . .”). 
 
156 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216. 
 
157 Id. at 217-18.  Merely having one or two employees “contemplate the possibility” of 
litigation does not generally give rise to a preservation duty.  Id. at 217.  But here, the 
court reasoned that “almost everyone associated with [plaintiff] recognized the possibility 
that she might sue.”  Id.  Because the “relevant people . . . anticipated litigation in April 
2001,” the duty to preserve attached then.  Id.  
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need not preserve all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates 
litigation.”159  Conversely, however, “anyone who anticipates being a 
party or is a party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant evidence 
that might be useful to an adversary.”160  The duty to preserve accordingly 
“extends to those employees likely to have relevant information—the ‘key 
players’ in the case.”161  Further, the scope of the duty encompasses “all 
relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in existence at the 
time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents created 
thereafter.”162   
 
[39] To sum up, then, “[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, 
it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put 
in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant 
documents.”163  This hold “does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes 
(e.g., those typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster 
recovery), which may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in 
the company’s policy.”164  But, “if backup tapes are accessible (i.e., 
actively used for information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be 
subject to the litigation hold.”165  The court did draw one significant 
                                                                                                                         
158 Id. at 217. 
 
159 Id.  Notably, the court recognized that requiring otherwise could “cripple large 
corporations, like [defendant], that are almost always involved in litigation.”  Id. 
 
160 Id.  
 
161 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218.  The court noted that all of the missing backup tapes 
belonged to key employees of defendant.  Id.  
 
162 Id.  The court left to each litigant’s discretion how this preservation is accomplished.  
Id. 
 
163 Id.  
 
164 Id. 
 
165 Id. 
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exception to the foregoing:  “[i]f a company can identify where particular 
employee documents are stored on backup tapes, then the tapes storing the 
documents of ‘key players’ to the . . . litigation should be preserved . . . 
.”166 
 
[40] Applying these principles, the court concluded defendant had 
breached its duty by failing to preserve the backup tapes in question.167  In 
determining the appropriate remedy, the court rejected plaintiff’s request 
that it reconsider its earlier order on cost-shifting.168 
 
[41] Similarly, the court declined plaintiff’s plea for an adverse 
inference instruction.169  In doing so, the court reasoned that an adverse 
inference is appropriate only when the following three elements are 
satisfied:  (1) the spoliator destroyed the evidence when under a duty to 
preserve it; (2) the evidence was destroyed with a “‘culpable state of 
mind’”;170 and (3) “the destroyed evidence was relevant;”171 that is, it 
                                                 
166 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. 
 
167 Id. at 219. 
 
168 Id.  The court noted that in deciding the cost-shifting motion, it “was well aware that 
certain e-mails had not been retained and that certain backup tapes were missing.”  Id. 
 
169 Id.  The instruction would have directed the jury that it could “infer from the fact that 
[defendant] destroyed certain evidence that the evidence, if available, would have been 
favorable to [plaintiff] and harmful to [defendant].”  Id.  The court recognized the 
obvious “in terrorem effect” and “extreme sanction” of an adverse inference, which 
counseled that it “should not be given lightly.”  Id. at 220. 
 
170 Id. at 220.  Counterintuitively, “ordinary negligence” may suffice to show a “‘culpable 
state of mind.’”  Id. (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 
F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)).    
 
171 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220.  When evidence “is destroyed in bad faith (i.e., 
intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate relevance.”  Id.  On 
the other hand, if the “destruction is negligent, relevance must be proven by the party 
seeking the sanctions.”  Id.   
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would support a party’s claim or defense.172  While the court concluded 
defendant had a duty to preserve the backup tapes that were destroyed, and 
that the destruction was at a minimum negligent, it ruled that plaintiff 
failed to show the relevance of the destroyed tapes.173  Thus, the court 
deemed the requested adverse inference “inappropriate.”174  The court did, 
however, order that defendant bear plaintiff’s costs for re-deposing certain 
witnesses “for the limited purpose of inquiring into issues raised by the 
destruction of evidence and any newly discovered e-mails.”175 
 
E. Zubulake V—Adverse Inference 
 
[42] After conducting the additional depositions authorized in Zubulake 
IV, plaintiff discovered that certain of defendant’s employees deleted 
relevant e-mails from their active accounts.176  Defendant subsequently 
recovered some of those e-mails from backup tapes and produced them to 
plaintiff, although long after her initial document requests, while others 
were permanently lost.177  Thus, in Zubulake V the court clarified the 
obligations of both the parties and their counsel with respect to the 
preservation, location, and production of ESI.178 
                                                 
172 Id.  
 
173 Id. at 220-21.  Because defendant’s spoliation was not willful, plaintiff had to 
“demonstrate that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the missing e-mails would 
support her claims.”  Id. at 221.  But the court found “no reason to believe that the lost e-
mails would” do so in those particular circumstances.  Id. 
 
174 Id. at 222. 
 
175 Id.  
 
176 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 
177 Id.  Plaintiff also presented evidence that some of defendant’s employees did not 
produce documents until nearly two years after her requests.  Id.  
 
178 Id. at 424.  In the court’s view, satisfying these obligations starts with the need for 
effective communication:  “Lawyers and their clients need to communicate clearly and 
effectively with one another to ensure that litigation proceeds efficiently.”  Id. 
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[43] The court recognized that early in the litigation, prior to the 
destruction, defense “counsel—both in-house and outside—instructed 
[key] personnel to retain relevant electronic information.”179  But the court 
noted that the issuance of a litigation hold is the beginning, not the end, of 
a party’s discovery obligations.180  After the hold is issued, a party and its 
counsel must “make certain that all sources of potentially relevant 
information are identified” and retained.181  Necessarily, then, counsel 
“must become fully familiar” with the “client’s document retention 
policies, as well as the client’s data retention architecture.”182  In the 
court’s view, this will entail “speaking with [IT] personnel, who can 
explain system-wide backup procedures and the actual (as opposed to 
theoretical) implementation of the firm’s recycling policy.”183   
 
[44] Further, counsel must communicate with “the ‘key players’ in the 
litigation, in order to understand how they stored information.”184  In order 
to ensure that relevant information is preserved, the court instructed that 
the litigation hold “should be periodically re-issued so that new employees 
are aware of it, and so that it is fresh in the minds of all employees.”185  
Finally, it is not enough to just issue the hold—counsel also “should 
instruct all employees to produce electronic copies of their relevant active 
                                                 
179 Id.  
 
180 Id. at 432.   
 
181 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432. 
 
182 Id. 
 
183 Id.; see Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that counsel should inquire into 
“whether the information to be discovered has been deleted or is available only on 
backup tapes or legacy systems”). 
 
184 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432.  The court noted that “[u]nless counsel interviews each 
employee, it is impossible to determine whether all potential sources of information have 
been inspected.”  Id. 
 
185 Id. at 433. 
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files,” as well as ensure that “all backup media which the party is required 
to retain is identified and stored in a safe place.”186  While this last point 
seems obvious, the court noted a “primary reason[] that electronic data is 
lost is ineffective communication with [IT] personnel.  By taking 
possession of . . . all potentially relevant backup tapes, counsel eliminates 
the possibility that such tapes will be inadvertently recycled.”187 
 
[45] Applying these principles, the court recognized that while 
defendant’s counsel acted “reasonably” in issuing a litigation hold, they 
were nevertheless “not entirely blameless” in the failure to preserve 
relevant documents.188  Primarily, the court faulted counsel for failing to 
“properly oversee” defendant’s response to the litigation hold, “both in 
terms of its duty to locate relevant information and its duty to preserve and 
timely produce that information.”189  At the same time, however, the court 
recognized that “the duty to preserve and produce documents rests on the 
party.”190  Thus, “[o]nce that duty is made clear . . . either by court order 
or by instructions from counsel, [a] party is on notice of its obligations and 
acts at its own peril.”191  According to the court, defendant’s 
“employees—for unknown reasons—ignored many of the instructions that 
                                                 
186 Id. at 434.  For an example of noncompliance, see Kier v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 
02 CIV. 8781 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14522 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003). 
 
187 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 434. 
 
188 Id. at 435.  Specifically, the court noted that counsel “failed to communicate the 
litigation hold to all key players.”  Id. at 436.   
 
189 Id. at 435.  The court conceded that counsel are not required to “supervise every step 
of the document production process,” but nevertheless are “responsible for coordinating 
[a] client’s discovery efforts.”  Id.  Here, counsel failed to ensure that defendant’s 
employees complied with the preservation instructions given.  Id. 
 
190 Id. at 436. 
 
191 Id. 
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counsel gave.”192  Finding the resulting destruction of potentially relevant 
information to be willful, 193 the court ruled to issue an adverse inference 
instruction about the missing e-mails to the jury.194 
 
F. Philip Morris—Witnesses Precluded, Monetary Sanction 
 
[46] In United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., the court denied the 
government’s request for an adverse inference.195  Eleven of defendant’s 
most senior employees failed to follow appropriate document retention 
procedures, resulting in the loss of a “significant number” of e-mails.196  
While terming it “astounding” that the employees did not preserve the 
documents in question, and concluding it had the “authority to impose [an 
adverse inference] for a discovery violation as serious and irremediable197 
                                                 
192 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 436.  Indeed, defendant deleted many e-mails “in defiance 
of explicit instructions not to.”  Id. 
 
193 Id.  
 
194 Id. at 437.  A number of other pre-amendment cases involved awards of sanctions 
based on destruction of electronic information.  See, e.g., Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 
F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming sanction of dismissal and $65,000 fine against 
plaintiff who intentionally destroyed computer files during litigation); Krumwiede v. 
Brighton Assocs., LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31669, at *24-25 , *29-32  (N.D. Ill. May 
8, 2006) (entering default judgment against plaintiff for intentionally destroying 
computer data); Metropolitan Opera Assoc., Inc. v. Local 100, 212 F.R.D. 178, 222 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting default judgment as discovery sanction against defendant); In 
re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 617 (D.N.J. 1997) (imposing 
a $1 million sanction for failure to comply with preservation order); Wm. T. Thompson 
Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (entering default 
judgment based on destruction of electronic information).  
 
195 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2004).  In 
Philip Morris, the federal government alleged defendants violated the RICO statute by 
allegedly deceiving the American public about the health effects of smoking.  See United 
States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 
196 Philip Morris, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 24.  The employees’ actions violated both 
defendant’s own retention policies as well as a case management order entered by the 
court.  Id. at 25. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 32 
as [defendant’s] e-mail destruction,” the court nevertheless found this “far-
reaching sanction . . . simply inappropriate.”198  In particular, the court 
concluded that such a sanction would be disproportionate to the offense 
and thus “cast[] too wide a net.”199 
 
[47] The court did, however, preclude the employees who failed to 
follow the retention procedures from “testifying in any capacity at 
trial.”200  In addition, the court ordered that defendant pay a monetary 
sanction of $2.75 million.201  The court termed the fine “particularly 
appropriate” because it had “no way of knowing what, if any, value th[e] 
destroyed e-mails had to Plaintiff’s case; because of that absence of 
knowledge, it was impossible to fashion a proportional evidentiary 
sanction that would accurately target the discovery violation.”202 
 
G. Phoenix Four—Attorneys Sanctioned 
 
[48] In Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corp.,203 the court 
determined that the late production of certain electronic evidence did not 
                                                                                                                         
197 Id. at 25.  The court noted that because it did not know what had been destroyed, it 
was “impossible to accurately assess” the damage done.   
 
198 Id. 
 
199 Id.    
 
200 Id.; see also Thompson v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 93, 104 (D. Md. 1993) 
(precluding defendant from relying on e-mails that were not timely produced). 
 
201 Philip Morris, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 26.  Elsewhere in the opinion, the court said that 
“each such individual” who failed to comply with the retention procedures “is being 
sanctioned in the amount of $250,000.”  Id. at 26 n.1.  But the court levied the fine 
against the defendant, not the individuals themselves.  Id.   
 
202 Id. 
 
203 Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 CIV. 4837 (HB), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32211 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2006).  Plaintiff sued its investment adviser and the 
adviser’s principals alleging, inter alia, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  Id. at *1-2.  
Plaintiff was defendant’s sole client.  Id. at *3.    
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justify an adverse inference instruction.204  Shortly before the litigation 
commenced, defendants vacated their offices.205  While defendants took 
about fifty boxes of documents and two servers and computer 
workstations, they left behind at least ten other workstations.206  One of 
the defendants used one of the servers in his new business.207   
 
[49] After suit was filed, defendants’ counsel advised them of the need 
to gather and preserve both paper and electronic documents.208  
Defendants responded that they had not located any relevant electronic 
documents.209  Subsequently, one of the servers taken from defendants’ 
former offices malfunctioned, necessitating a service call.210  The 
repairman discovered about 25 gigabytes of data stored in a portion of the 
server that was not viewable from a workstation.211  After determining that 
much of the information was relevant, defendants’ counsel produced it; 
the production came several months after defendants had represented they 
had produced all responsive documents.212  
 
[50] Plaintiff moved for a number of sanctions based on defendants’ 
failure to preserve and timely produce the relevant electronic 
                                                 
204 Id. at *22. 
 
205 Id. at *5.   
 
206 Id. 
 
207 Id. at *6. 
 
208 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *6. 
 
209 Id.  Defendants did produce the roughly fifty boxes of documents taken from their old 
offices.  Id. at *7. 
 
210 Id.  
 
211 Id.  The material was the equivalent of as much as 2,500 boxes of documents.  Id. 
 
212 Id. at *8-9. 
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information.213  First, plaintiff sought an adverse inference due to 
defendants abandoning the computer workstations at their former 
offices.214  While concluding that defendants were under a duty to 
preserve at the time of the abandonment, and thus were grossly negligent 
in leaving the computers behind,215 the court nevertheless found an 
adverse inference inappropriate.216  In particular, the court noted that 
plaintiff had not come forward with any proof the abandoned evidence 
would have supported its claim, as required for an adverse inference.217   
 
[51] Plaintiff also sought an adverse inference based on defendants’ late 
production of the documents found on the server.218  Here, the court 
focused on defense counsel’s role in the failure to timely produce the 
information.219  Relying on Zubulake V, the court noted that counsel has a 
duty to “properly communicate with its client to ensure that ‘all sources of 
relevant information [are] discovered.’”220  The duty is not “confined to a 
request for documents,” but rather encompasses a “search for sources of 
information.”221 
 
                                                 
213 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *2. 
 
214 Id. at *13-14.   
 
215 Id. at *15.  The court, however, concluded that the gross negligence alone did not 
support an inference that the discarded evidence was favorable to plaintiff, based in part 
on the “upheaval in the defendants’ business.”  Id.  
 
216 Id. at *15-16. 
 
217 Id.  Indeed, plaintiff conceded that it would “never know whether there were favorable 
documents” that were destroyed.  Id. at *15. 
 
218 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *16. 
 
219 Id. 
 
220 Id. (citation omitted). 
 
221 Id. at *17. 
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[52] The court concluded that defense counsel “never undertook the 
more methodical survey of [defendants’] sources of information that Judge 
Scheindlin outlined in Zubulake V.”222  Rather, according to the court, 
defense counsel “simply accepted the defendants’ representation that . . . 
there were no computers or electronic collections to search.”223  Had 
defense counsel “been diligent, it might have asked—as it should have—
what had happened to the computers [defendants] used at [their former 
office.]  This question alone would have alerted [defense counsel] to the 
existence of the server that the defendants had taken with them from their 
former office.”224  The court emphasized that counsel’s duty was not to 
“retrieve information from a difficult-to-access source, such as the server 
here, but rather to ascertain whether any information is stored there.”225 
 
[53] Finding that defense counsel’s conduct amounted to gross 
negligence,226 the court then concluded the delinquently produced 
evidence would support plaintiff’s claims.227  Thus, plaintiff “established 
the elements necessary for an adverse inference instruction.”228  The court, 
                                                 
222 Id.  
 
223 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *17.   
 
224 Id. at *18. 
 
225 Id. (footnote omitted).  The court’s analysis was “guided by the proposed amendments 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,” which became effective several months after the 
ruling.  Id.  The court characterized the proposed amendments as “essentially codify[ing] 
the teaching of Zubulake IV & V, of which [defense counsel] should have been well 
aware.”  Id. at *19.  
 
226 Id. at *19-20.  Further, the court held defendants were “at the least negligent in 
carelessly representing to counsel that ‘there were no computers to search’ when they 
knew that they still possessed, and were actually using at least one of,” the old servers.  
Id. (alteration in original). 
 
227 Id. at *20-21.  Indeed, the court termed the documents “central” to plaintiffs’ claims.  
Id. at *21. 
 
228 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *21. 
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however, declined to award “such a severe sanction,” reasoning that 
defendants had “come forward with the evidence, even if after the close of 
discovery.”229 
 
[54] Similarly, the court denied plaintiff’s request for various sanctions 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37,230 including that:  (1) 
defendants be precluded from raising certain defenses; (2) defendants be 
precluded from relying on certain of the late produced documents; and (3) 
certain facts be deemed admitted against defendants.231  Again, the court 
concluded that since the documents were produced, albeit late, any type of 
preclusion sanction was “not warranted.”232 
 
                                                 
229 Id.  In stark contrast, in Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
Inc., 2005 WL 679071, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 955 So. 
2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), later proceeding at 20 So. 3d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009), defendant’s failure to preserve and search backup tapes led to a large number of 
relevant e-mails being irretrievably lost in a suit alleging fraud in a corporate acquisition.  
The failure to preserve evidence was exacerbated by defendant’s and “its counsel’s lack 
of candor [which] frustrated the court and opposing counsel’s ability to be fully and 
timely informed.”  Id.  The court ultimately found defendant had engaged in a “willful 
and gross abuse of its discovery obligations.”  Id.  In response, the court granted a 
number of severe sanctions, including rendering a partial default judgment, and ordering 
that (1)  defendant would bear the burden of proving it lacked knowledge of the alleged 
fraud; and (2) allowing the jury to derive whatever inferences it chose from the facts 
related to defendant’s discovery failures.  Id. at *7-8.  Not surprisingly, the jury 
ultimately returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of 
approximately $1.6 billion.  See Susan Beck, Morgan Stanley’s Recipe for Disaster, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (ALM), June 5, 2006.  
 
230 Rule 37 provided:  “A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose 
information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery 
as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as 
evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so 
disclosed.”  Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *23 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(c)(1) (2003)). 
 
231 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *25. 
 
232 Id. at *26.   
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[55] The court then addressed plaintiff’s request for monetary 
sanctions.233  Noting that defendants’ late production “severely disrupted 
the progress of th[e] litigation,” the court concluded that “monetary 
sanctions w[ould] most appropriately serve the prophylactic, punitive, and 
remedial purposes of discovery sanctions.”234  Thus, the court ordered that 
defendants reimburse plaintiff for its costs and attorney’s fees associated 
with bringing the motion.235  Interestingly, this sanction was also levied 
against defense counsel; that is, the sanction was to “be borne by the 
[defendants] and [defense counsel] equally, and not by the [d]efendants’ 
insurance carriers.”236           
 
III. DECEMBER 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES 
 
[56] With this background, it is now useful to examine the 2006 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with e-
discovery.  As noted earlier, in recent years the increasing prevalence of 
electronic information has led to a corresponding increase in e-discovery 
disputes.237  Enacted in 1970, however, the prior version of the Federal 
                                                 
233 Id. at *27.  In this regard, the court noted that even when it “denies other requested 
relief, it may still impose monetary sanctions for spoliation and other discovery 
misconduct.”  Id. 
 
234 Id. at *28. 
 
235 Id. at *28-29.  The court also ordered that defendants and their counsel pay $10,000 
each for the re-depositions of three witnesses for “the limited purpose of inquiring into 
issues raised by the documents recovered from the server.”  Id. at *29.  Ultimately, the 
court awarded plaintiff $45,161.82 in fees and costs.  Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic 
Resources Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006). 
 
236 Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *29.  The court did not identify the 
basis of its authority to sanction defense counsel in addition to defendants.  Id.  Notably, 
“Rule 37(c)(1) does not permit sanctions against counsel.”  Grider v. Keystone Health 
Plan Central, Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 141 (3d Cir. 2009); Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 
470 (7th Cir. 2003); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 
1988).   
 
237 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005) at 23, 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 38 
Rules did not contemplate the subsequent increasing importance of e-
discovery.238  Thus, prior to the amendments to the Federal Rules, courts 
tended to resolve disputes about such discovery on an ad hoc basis.239  
Correspondingly, various disparate state and local rules240 were created to 
fill the “gap between existing discovery rules and practice . . . .”241  Given 
the likelihood of inconsistency and confusion resulting from “a patchwork 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf, 
[hereinafter STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT], (“[D]iscovery of [ESI] is becoming more 
time-consuming, burdensome, and costly.”); supra Section II. 
 
238 Id. Prior to the amendments, Federal Rules provided “inadequate guidance” on e-
discovery.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes (“[As] originally adopted, Rule 
34 focused on discovery of ‘documents’ and ‘things.’  In 1970, Rule 34(a) was amended 
to include discovery of data compilations, anticipating that the use of computerized 
information would increase.  [But] [s]ince then, the growth in [ESI] and in the variety of 
systems for creating and storing such information has been dramatic.”); Symposium, 
Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *5 (“It was time to bring the discovery 
rules more in line with the demands of modern practice.”).  
 
239 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, at 23 (“Developing case law on 
discovery into [ESI] under the current rules is not consistent and is necessarily limited by 
the specific facts involved.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes (Under the 
prior version of Rule 34, “[l]awyers and judges interpreted the term ‘documents’ to 
include [ESI] because it was obviously improper to allow a party to evade discovery 
obligations on the basis that the label had not kept pace with changes in information 
technology.  But it has become increasingly difficult to say that all forms of [ESI], many 
dynamic in nature, fit within the traditional concept of a ‘document.’”); Myles V. Lynk, 
et al., Panel Discussion: Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 119, 120 (Oct. 2004) (noting that prior to 
amendments to Federal Rules, there was “no national uniformity in [the] emerging area 
of electronic discovery”); supra Section II. 
 
240 See Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 1 & n.1 (listing local rules addressing e-discovery); 
Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 13, ¶ 3 & nn.9-10 (2006). 
 
241 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, at 23 (noting that a number of 
courts were considering adopting local rules prior to the amendments to the Federal 
Rules). 
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of rules and requirements,”242 the amendments to the Federal Rules sought 
to bring uniformity by specifically providing processes for the discovery 
of ESI.243   
 
[57] In sum, the amendments provide that like other relevant 
information, ESI is discoverable; parties must preserve and, if otherwise 
discoverable, produce ESI; counsel must understand ESI procedures; and 
courts will have the means to address difficulties, through cost-shifting 
and other means.244  The specific amendments, which affected Rules 
16(b), 26(a), 26(b)(2), 26(b)(5), 26(f), 33, 34(a), 34(b), 37(f), and 45, as 
well as Form 35, are briefly summarized infra.245   
 
A. Early Attention to ESI—Rules 16(b) and 26(f) 
 
[58] As amended, in connection with the initial planning session and 
subsequent scheduling order, Rules 16(b) and 26(f) require the parties to 
                                                 
242 Id. at 23-24 (recognizing the “costs of complying with unclear and at times vague 
discovery obligations, which vary from district to district in ways unwarranted by local 
variations in practice, are becoming increasingly problematic”). 
 
243 See id. at 23 (noting need for “national rules adequate to address the issues raised by 
electronic discovery”); Allman, supra note 240, at *1 (explaining that the amendments 
resulted from a “conviction that e-discovery presents unique issues requiring uniform 
national rules”). 
 
244 See Craig Ball, Hitting the High Points of the New E-Discovery Rules, LAW PRACTICE 
TODAY, Oct. 2006, at 2 (“ESI is discoverable; Clients must preserve and produce ESI; 
Lawyers must understand how to request, protect, review and produce ESI; The courts 
have the tools to rectify abusive or obstructive electronic discovery”). 
 
245 Effective December 1, 2007, the Federal Rules were revised to reflect stylistic 
changes.  See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE at v, available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_pt1.pd
f.  No substantive changes were intended by these amendments, as they were “intended to 
be primarily stylistic only.”  Id.  For clarity of reference, this article will discuss the 
versions of the Rules effective as of December 1, 2007.    
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confer early on regarding ESI.246  New Rule 26(f) provides that the 
parties’ discovery plan must address “any issues about disclosure or 
discovery of [ESI], including the form or forms in which it should be 
produced”.247  Thus, at their initial meet and confer the parties should 
discuss not only the basic question of whether there will be discovery of 
ESI and what types of such information each party has, but also “whether 
the information to be discovered has been deleted or is available only on 
backup tapes or legacy systems; the anticipated schedule for production 
and the format and media of that production; the difficulty and cost of 
producing the information and reallocation of costs, if appropriate; and the 
responsibilities of each party to preserve ESI.”248  As per Zubulake,249 for 
the meet and confer to be effective “attorneys must be familiar with how 
their clients use computers on a daily basis and understand what 
                                                 
246 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, at 26 (noting that under the new 
Rule 26(f), “the parties’ conference is to include discussion of any issues relating to 
disclosure or discovery of [ESI]”); Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 4 (noting parties 
“should address ESI in the earliest stages of the litigation, and judges should encourage 
them to do so”).  Unless exempted from the initial disclosure requirements, the “parties 
must confer as soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling 
conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(f)(1). 
 
247 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).  Rule 26(f) has been called the “most important e-
discovery rule . . . because it gives the parties an opportunity to reach agreement on the 
‘contours’ of the civil litigation in which they are engaged and, just as importantly, agree 
on what they disagree about and present their disputes for early judicial resolution . . . .”  
Ronald J. Hedges, The Most Important E-Discovery Rule, L. TECH. NEWS, May 19, 2009. 
 
248 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 4-5; see STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
237, at 26-27. 
 
249 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  In fact, the author of the Zubulake 
decisions, Judge Scheindlein, was on the drafting committee for the revised Federal 
Rules.  Judge Shira Scheindlin, Resume, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, 
http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/shiraas chiendlin.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
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information is available, how routine computer operations may change it, 
and what is entailed in producing it.”250    
 
[59] Under amended Rule 16(b), the resulting scheduling order will 
memorialize the parties’ obligations regarding the discovery of ESI.251  In 
addition, as a companion piece to Rule 26’s so-called “clawback” 
provision, discussed infra,252 the scheduling order will detail any 
agreements the parties reach regarding asserting privilege or work product 
claims after production of ESI.253  
 
B. Initial Disclosures of ESI—Rule 26(a)(1) 
 
[60] Initial disclosure requirements under Rule 26 have likewise been 
modified in several ways.  Most significantly, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) was 
amended to add ESI to the voluntary disclosure requirement.254  Thus, 
without a discovery request, a party must “provide . . . a copy—or a 
description by category and location” of any ESI in its possession that it 
                                                 
250 See Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 5.  Indeed, for a “meaningful Rule 26(f) conference 
[to] take place,” the attorneys involved must be adequately informed about their clients’ 
IT systems.  Id. at 4-5 (“Attorneys need to identify those persons who are most 
knowledgeable about the client’s computer system and meet with them.”).  It may even 
be advisable to have IT personnel present at the meet and confer.  See Pocket Guide, 
supra note 2, at 5; Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *15 
(“Judges may actually come to require more and more that lawyers bring their IT people 
to the meet-and-confer.”). 
 
251 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv).  Form 35 has also been amended to “call for a 
report to the court about the results of” the meet and confer.  FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory 
committee’s note.   
 
252 See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text. 
 
253 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv); STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, 
at 27 (“The parties are also directed to discuss whether they can agree on approaches to 
asserting claims of privilege or work-product protection after inadvertent production in 
discovery.”); Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 5. 
 
254 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
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may use to support its claim or defense, unless the ESI would be used 
solely for impeachment.255  
 
[61] This provision does not address whether or to what extent the 
inaccessibility of a particular piece of information impacts a party’s duty 
to disclose.256  The Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, which was 
published before the amended Federal Rules went into effect, provides 
that “parties have a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation pursuant to 
disclosure, particularly when a party possesses extensive computerized 
data, which may be subject to disclosure or later discovery.”257  Left 
unstated is whether this “reasonable investigation” should reach 
inaccessible information.258  Other commentators, however, have 
suggested that while a party should “identify the nature of its computer 
system—including back-up system, network system, and e-mail system—
as well as any software applications used to operate those systems,” the 
party is not required to “attempt to search back-up systems or to retrieve 
deleted files in an exhaustive effort to locate all potentially relevant 
evidence as part of this initial disclosure obligation.”259 
 
C. Scope of Discovery of ESI—Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2) 
 
[62] Amended Rule 26(b) incorporates the concept of two-tiered 
discovery which had already existed under the Rules, and applies it to 
                                                 
255 Id.; see Ball, supra note 244, at 2.  Initial disclosures must be made within 14 days of 
the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is stipulated or ordered by the 
court.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 
 
256 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).  
 
257 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.13 (2004).   
 
258 Id.  The Manual does note, however, that actual production of initial disclosures is not 
required; rather, a party only has to identify relevant information and materials.  Id.; see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 
259 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37A.20[2] (3d ed. 2005)). 
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ESI.260  In particular, amended Rule 26(b)(2)(B) introduces the principle 
of “reasonable accessibility,”261 establishing that a “party need not provide 
discovery of [ESI] from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”262  On a motion either to 
compel or for protective order, the party refusing discovery bears the 
burden of showing the information sought is not reasonably accessible.263  
The party seeking the ESI “may need discovery to test the assertion that 
the information is not reasonably accessible.”264  This discovery might 
include sampling information contained on the sources identified as not 
reasonably accessible, inspecting those sources, or taking depositions of 
persons with knowledge of the supposedly inaccessible sources.265   
                                                 
260 Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *9.  The first tier is 
“party-managed discovery,” which requires no court order and encompasses information 
that is relevant, not privileged, and—in the case of ESI—“reasonably accessible.”  Id.; 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes.  The 
second tier is “court-supervised discovery,” meaning that “[c]ourt approval is required 
before the information can be obtained.”  Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, 
supra note 19, at *9.  ESI that is not “reasonably accessible” is now included in the 
second tier.  Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  
 
261 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  The “responding party must . . . identify, by category 
or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is neither 
searching nor producing.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes. 
 
262 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes 
(recognizing that “some sources of [ESI] can be accessed only with substantial burden 
and cost.  In a particular case, these burdens and costs may make the information on such 
sources not reasonably accessible.”). 
 
263 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see Ball, supra note 244, at 3 (“[I]f an opponent objects, 
your client must prove inaccessibility in court.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s 
notes (“[T]he responding party must show that the identified sources of information are 
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”). 
 
264 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 8. 
 
265 See Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *11 (“Courts are 
using methods like sampling, for example, ordering parties to restore a small portion of a 
back-up tape, or one of several back-up tapes, in order to see both how hard it is to get to 
the information—what is the nature and extent of the forensic or other kind of work 
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[63] Even if inaccessibility is demonstrated, the court may still order 
discovery if the requesting party establishes “good cause.”266  In assessing 
good cause, the following factors are relevant:   
 
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity 
of information available from other and more easily 
accessed sources;267 (3) the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no 
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the 
likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that 
cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed 
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness 
of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources.268   
 
The good cause determination is subject to the proportionality test found 
in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which essentially limits discovery where the cost and 
burden outweighs the potential benefit.269  
 
                                                                                                                         
necessary to make this information accessible—and how valuable the information really 
is.”).  
 
266 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  The burden of showing good cause is on the party 
seeking discovery.  Id. 
 
267 Indeed, it has been suggested that parties should “first sort through the information 
that can be provided from easily accessed sources and then determine whether it is 
necessary to search the less-accessible sources.”  Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 8. 
 
268 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes. 
 
269 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).  In theory, this is the case, but some commentators have 
noted that proportionality limits “have not proven effective.”  See, e.g., Symposium, 
Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *10.  Thus, the amendments also seek 
to “make those proportionality limits more effective in this new area where they are the 
most important.”  Id. 
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[64] While good cause and proportionality is established on a case by 
case basis,270 whether discovery of challenged ESI will be allowed “often 
turns on the type of computer data being sought.”271  Thus, the production 
of “active data, available to the responding party in the ordinary course of 
business, is most likely to satisfy the proportionality test.”272  Conversely, 
systems data, such as “when people logged on and off a computer or 
network, the applications and passwords they used, and what websites 
they visited,” can be more costly to produce, and consequently less likely 
to satisfy the proportionality test.273  If good cause is established, the court 
“may specify conditions for the discovery,”274 such as cost-shifting.275 
 
 
 
                                                 
270 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“circumstances of the case” must 
be considered in determining whether good cause is shown); Symposium, Managing 
Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *10 (good cause determination is “case by case”). 
 
271 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 7. 
 
272 Id.  “Active electronic records are generally those currently being created, received, or 
processed, or that need to be accessed frequently and quickly.”  Id.  Of course, active data 
is generally considered accessible.  Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 
273 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 7.  Other types of data may be even more removed 
from the ordinary course of business and therefore expensive to retrieve and review, i.e., 
inaccessible.  These include “offline archival media, backup tapes designed for restoring 
computer systems in the event of a disaster, deleted files, and legacy data, which were 
created on now-obsolete computer systems with obsolete operating and computer 
software.”  Id. at 7–8. 
 
274 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 
275 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“The conditions may . . . include 
payment by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtaining 
information from sources that are not reasonably accessible.”).  In addition, the 
“conditions may take the form of limits on the amount, type, or sources of information 
required to be accessed and produced.”  Id.; see Ball, supra note 244, at 3 (after good 
cause is shown, party’s “recourse is to ask the court to tailor the production order to 
minimize” burden).   
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D. Clawback Provision—Rule 26(b)(5)(B) 
 
[65] The typical volume of ESI in a given case frequently increases the 
time, effort, and expense required to perform a privilege review prior to 
production.276  Indeed, given the universe of responsive information, it can 
be difficult to ensure that all ESI is reviewed for privilege before 
production.277  Amended Rule 26(b)(5)(B) recognizes this increased risk 
of waiver and establishes a procedure for parties to attempt to assert 
attorney-client or work product privilege after ESI has been produced.278 
 
[66] Under this so-called “clawback” or “sneak-peek” procedure, if 
information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or 
work product protection, the party asserting the privilege may “notify any 
party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it.”279  
After receiving notice, the opposing party must “promptly return, 
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has . . . 
.”280  Further, the receiving party “must not use or disclose the information 
until the claim is resolved [and] must take reasonable steps to retrieve the 
information if the party disclosed it before being notified” of the privilege 
                                                 
276 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“[T]he burdens and costs of 
accessing and retrieving the information”). 
 
277 See Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *7 (“The 
likelihood of inadvertent production of privileged information is greater with electronic 
information than it was with paper, for [a number of reasons]: its volume, its dynamic 
nature, the way in which it is stored, and the way it appears when viewed on a screen or 
printed out.”); Ball, supra note 244, at 4 (parties are “fast losing the ability to review 
individual items, and it’s increasingly common for privileged and non-privileged content 
to insidiously mix”). 
 
278 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 
279 Id.  The notice should be in writing unless circumstances dictate otherwise, such as 
asserting the claim during a deposition.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes.  
In addition, the “notice should be as specific as possible in identifying the information 
and stating the basis for the claim.”  Id. 
 
280 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
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claim.281  The receiving party may present the information to the court 
under seal for a determination of whether the privilege applies.282  It is 
incumbent on the producing party to preserve the information until the 
claim is decided.283 
 
[67] By its nature, the “clawback” procedure does not address the 
substantive question of whether a privilege that is not asserted until after 
production is waived.284  Rather, courts “should rely on developed 
principles to determine whether, and under what circumstances, waiver 
results from inadvertent production.”285  Thus, for example, “unreasonable 
delay in seeking the return of privileged information may give rise to a 
waiver.”286 
 
[68] Significantly, any agreement reached by the parties under Rules 
26(f) and 16(b) regarding post-production assertions of privilege will 
“ordinarily control” over contrary procedures set forth in Rule 26(b)(5).287  
The substantive law of privilege is beyond the scope of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, however.288  Thus, while any such agreement may 
bind the parties, in the absence of substantive law it may not be effective 
                                                 
281 Id. 
 
282 Id. 
 
283 Id. 
 
284 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“In most circumstances, a party 
who receives information under such an arrangement cannot assert that production of the 
information waived a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material.”). 
 
285 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 16. 
 
286 Id. 
 
287 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes; see Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 16.  
It should be noted that the court is not authorized to “require the parties to enter into such 
an arrangement, absent their agreement.”  Id. at 15.  
 
288 Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 15. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 48 
against third parties in subsequent litigation.289  Fortunately, such 
substantive law has recently been enacted in the form of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502.290  Pursuant to Rule 502, a “Federal court may order that 
the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the 
litigation pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also 
not a waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding.”291  The Rule also 
codifies the effect in later litigation of agreements among the parties 
regarding disclosure of privileged information:  unless incorporated into a 
court order, such agreements only bind the parties to the agreement.292 
 
E. Form of Production—Rules 33 and 34 
 
[69] Amendments to Rule 33(d) make clear that the option to produce 
business records in response to an interrogatory includes ESI.293  Notably, 
the option to produce business records applies only where “the burden of 
                                                 
289 See Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Md. 
2005) (“[E]ven if [such agreements] are enforceable as between the parties that enter into 
them, it is questionable whether they are effective against third parties.”). 
 
290 President Bush signed the law enacting Rule 502 on September 19, 2008.  See Pub. L. 
No. 110-322, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3537 (2008).  It applies in all cases commenced after that 
date and, “insofar as is just and practicable,” in all cases pending on that date.  See Pub. 
L. No. 110-322, § 1(c), 122 Stat. 3538 (2008).  The enactment of Rule 502 has been 
hailed as the “biggest event of 2008 . . . .”  Cecil Lynn III, et al., E-Discovery Rulings: 
2008 in Review, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, at 1. 
 
291 FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see, e.g., Rhoads Indus. v. Building Materials Corp., 254 F.R.D. 
216 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98400 
(D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008).  One key emerging and often outcome-determinative issue in Rule 
502 cases has been which party bears the burden of establishing waiver.  Compare 
Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 223, 227 (burden on party claiming waiver), with Relion, 2008 
U.S. Dist LEXIS 98400, at *5 (burden on party asserting privilege).  
 
292 FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
 
293 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (“If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by 
examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party’s business records 
(including [ESI]),” the responding party may produce the relevant records in responding 
to the interrogatory). 
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deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for 
either party . . . .”294  In addition, the responding party must ensure that its 
opponent “can locate and identify [the business records] ‘as readily as can 
the party served,’” and “must give the interrogating party a ‘reasonable 
opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect’ the information.”295  Thus, 
depending on the circumstances, the responding party may be required to 
“provide some combination of technical support, information on 
application software, or other assistance.”296  Indeed, it is conceivable that 
the responding party may have to “provide direct access to its electronic 
information system, but only if that is necessary to afford the requesting 
party an adequate opportunity to derive or ascertain the answer to the 
interrogatory.”297  
 
[70] Rule 34(a) now specifically provides that ESI is subject to 
production.298  The amended Rule does not provide a precise definition of 
ESI.299  Rather, the Rule is “expansive and includes any type of 
                                                 
294 Id. 
 
295 FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s notes. 
 
296 Id. 
 
297 Id.  Significantly, however, the amendments are not meant to “create a routine right of 
direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although such access might be 
justified in some circumstances.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.  
 
298 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (a)(1)(A).  In so amending the Rule, the drafting Committee 
confirmed that consistent with prior case law “discovery of [ESI] stands on equal footing 
with discovery of paper documents.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes; see, 
e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William 
Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y 2002).  
 
299 FED. R. CIV. P. 34; FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.  Recognizing that 
the “rapidity of technological change” counseled “against a limiting or precise definition 
of [ESI],” the amendment is “intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of 
computer-based information . . . .”  Id.  Moreover, the “same broad meaning” found in 
Rule 34 likewise applies to references to ESI in Rules 26(a)(1), 26(b)(2), 26(b)(5)(B), 
26(f), 34(b), 37(f), and 45.  Id.  
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information that is stored electronically.”300  The Rule now applies to 
information “stored in any medium,” in an attempt to capture “future 
developments in computer technology.”301 
 
[71] The requesting party “may specify the form or forms in which 
[ESI] is to be produced.”302 The responding party may object to the 
requested form; if it does so—“or if no form was specified in the 
request—the party must state the form or forms it intends to use.”303  If a 
request “does not specify a form for producing [ESI], a party must 
produce it in a form . . . in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a 
reasonably usable form . . . .”304  The option to produce in a reasonably 
usable form, however, “does not mean that a responding party is free to 
convert [ESI] from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a 
                                                 
300 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s  notes; see Ball, supra note 244, at 1 (ESI 
encompasses any “potentially relevant data that’s stored on computers, disks, tape, 
gadgets, and the Internet.”). 
 
301 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.  As noted previously, case law since 
the last amendment to Rule 34 in 1970 had frequently tried to stretch the definition of 
“document” to fit ESI.  See supra notes 238 & 239 and accompanying text. 
 
302 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C).  The requesting party is not required to specify the form 
of production.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.  Indeed, the rule 
recognizes that the “requesting party may not have a preference.”  Id.   
 
303 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).  Failure to specify the form to be used prior to production 
“runs a risk that the requesting party can show that the produced form is not reasonably 
usable and that it is entitled to production of some or all of the information in an 
additional form.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes; see Miller v. IBM, No. 
C 02-2118 MJJ (MEJ), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22506, *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2006) 
(requiring plaintiff to produce e-mail with attachments physically attached or provide 
specific references to enable defendant to identify which attachments belonged to which 
e-mails).  
 
304 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).  If the parties cannot agree on the form for production, 
they must meet and confer under Rule 37(a)(2)(B) and attempt to resolve the issue.  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.  In the event of a motion to compel, the court 
has wide discretion in picking a form of production, i.e., it “is not limited to the forms 
initially chosen by the requesting party, stated by the responding party, or specified in 
this rule for situations in which there is no court order or party agreement.”  Id. 
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different form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the 
requesting party to use the information efficiently in the litigation.”305  
Thus, similarly to amended Rule 33,306 under new Rule 34(a) a responding 
party may be required to “provide some reasonable amount of technical 
support, information on application software, or other reasonable 
assistance to enable the requesting party to use the information.”307  In any 
event, a party is not required to produce the same ESI “in more than one 
form.”308     
 
F. A Safe Harbor?  Rule 37 
 
[72] Rule 37(e) has been amended to address sanctions for the failure to 
produce ESI.309  The rule now provides that “[a]bsent exceptional 
circumstances,” a court may not impose sanctions based on the failure to 
provide ESI “lost as a result of the routine, good faith operation of an 
electronic information system.”310  As has been borne out by the relevant 
case law,311 however, the protection provided by this supposed “safe 
                                                 
305 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.  For example, if “the responding party 
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it searchable by 
electronic means, the information should not be produced in a form that removes or 
significantly degrades this feature.”  Id. 
 
306 See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 
307 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes. 
 
308 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). 
 
309 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 
310 Id.  The amendment thus recognizes that the “‘routine operation’ of computer systems 
includes the alteration and overwriting of information, often without the operator’s 
specific direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy 
documents.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes.   
 
311 See infra Section IV.A. 
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harbor”312 is far from absolute.313  In particular, a party is protected from 
sanctions only if it acted in “good faith”, which likely will turn on the 
timely issuance of a litigation hold.314  That is, the good faith requirement 
“means that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an 
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that 
operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it 
is required to preserve.”315 
 
G. Third-Party Discovery—Rule 45 
 
[73] Amendments to Rule 45 apply the changes regarding ESI made 
throughout the Federal Rules to subpoenas as well.  Specifically, ESI may 
now be subject to subpoena;316 ESI not reasonably accessible need not be 
                                                 
312 See Symposium, Panel Discussion: Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 72 (2004) (comments by 
Andrew M. Scherffius) (“[S]afe harbor is in a very general way considered to be 
provisions that will protect a defendant—or a plaintiff for that matter—who has 
destroyed or lost e-discovery under circumstances where they can show that their conduct 
was reasonable.”). 
 
313 See Gwendolyn Mariano, EDD Rules: The Great Debate, L. TECH. NEWS, Apr. 18, 
2005, at 2 (quoting Magistrate Ronald J. Hedges that amendments “will give minimal 
protection, at best, to attorneys and parties.  Indeed, the amendments constitute traps for 
the unwary.”). 
 
314 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes (“[Good faith] may involve a party’s 
intervention to modify or suspend certain features of [system’s] routine operation to 
prevent the loss of information, if that information is subject to a preservation 
obligation.”). 
 
315 Id. 
 
316 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii).  Similarly to documents or other tangible things, a 
subpoena for the production of ESI requires the responding party to “permit inspection, 
copying, testing, or sampling of the materials.”  FED. R. CIV. P.  45(a)(1)(D).   
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produced, unless the requesting party can show good cause;317 if the 
subpoena does not specify a form for the production, ESI shall be 
produced as it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form;318 
and, finally, if privileged ESI is inadvertently produced in response to a 
subpoena, clawback provisions similar to those provided in Rule 26(b)(5) 
are available.319    
 
IV. KEY POST-AMENDMENT DECISIONS REGARDING THE 
PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF ESI 
 
A. Duty of Preservation—Litigation Holds 
 
1. Cache La Poudre 
 
[74] One of the critical early issues under the amended Federal Rules 
was the duty of preservation and when it arose.320  In one leading case, 
Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., plaintiff accused 
defendant of spoliation based on the latter’s failure, after being put on 
notice of potential litigation, to “discontinue its practice . . . of routinely 
eliminating e-mail and overwriting backup electronic media.”321  
Preliminary to its analysis, the court acknowledged the “challenge of 
overseeing discovery at a time when potential access to [ESI] is virtually 
                                                 
317 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)(D).  If good cause is shown, the court may “specify 
conditions for the discovery,” i.e., allow the discovery “on terms that protect a nonparty 
against significant expense.”  Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes. 
 
318 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)(B).  If a particular form is requested, the responding party can 
object to that form.  Fed. R. Civ. 45(c)(2)(B). 
 
319 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B) (“If information produced in response to a subpoena is 
subject to a claim of privilege . . . the person making the claim may notify any party that 
received the information of the claim and the basis for it.  After being notified, a party 
must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information . . . .”). 
 
320 See infra Section IV.A. 
 
321 Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 
2007). 
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limitless, and when the costs and burdens associated with full discovery 
could be more outcome-determinative, as a practical matter, than the facts 
and substantive law.”322  Turning to the motion, the court “first 
determine[d] whether the missing documents or materials [were] relevant 
to an issue at trial.”323  Finding they “self-evident[ly]” were, the court then 
looked to whether defendant had a duty to preserve the materials when 
they were destroyed.324   
 
[75] While noting the duty to preserve evidence is typically “triggered 
by the filing of a lawsuit,” the court recognized the obligation may “arise 
even earlier if a party has notice that future litigation is likely.”325  Here, 
plaintiff argued that a phone call and letter it sent defendant almost two 
years before filing suit triggered the latter’s duty to preserve.326  The court, 
however, concluded that rather than threatening litigation, the letter 
implied that plaintiff “was willing to explore a negotiated resolution.”327  
Thus, the court ruled “[u]nder the particular facts of th[e] case,” 
defendant’s preservation duty did not arise until suit was filed.328  Thus, 
                                                 
322 Id. at 620.  In this regard, the court noted the “right to conduct discovery is not 
absolute.”  Id. at 619.  Rather, the Federal Rules recognize several limitations on “a 
party’s right to obtain discovery,” most notably when the “burden or expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, given the needs of the case, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed 
discovery in resolving the issues.”  Id. at 620 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)).     
 
323 Id. at 621.  The ESI in question related to a trademark dispute between the parties.  Id.  
 
324 Id.  
 
325 Id.  Given that “litigation ‘is an ever-present possibility’ in our society,” a mere 
chance of a lawsuit is insufficient to trigger the duty to preserve.  Id. (citation omitted); 
see Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (“[L]itigation must be more than a possibility” to trigger preservation duty).  The 
conclusion as to whether a duty to preserve exists “must be guided by the facts of each 
case.”  Cache La Poudre, 244 F.R.D. at 621.    
 
326 See id. at 621-22 (detailing the parties’ interactions over two years). 
 
327 Id. at 622. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 55 
the court denied plaintiff’s request for spoliation sanctions prior to that 
date.329   
 
[76] Plaintiff also sought sanctions based on alleged discovery abuses 
after the preservation duty had unquestionably arisen.330  Although 
defendant had issued a litigation hold within days after service of the suit, 
plaintiff contended that certain relevant documents had not been 
preserved.331  In particular, plaintiff argued that defendant should have 
contacted former employees to inquire whether they possessed relevant 
documents, which defendant did not do.332  The court declined to award 
sanctions on this basis, noting that plaintiff had deposed one ex-employee, 
and had not inquired into whether the person possessed any relevant 
documents.333 
                                                                                                                         
328 Id. at 624.  “As of that date, Defendants clearly had an obligation to preserve relevant 
evidence.”  Id. at 622. 
 
329 Id.  In contrast, in Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., LLC v. Winbond Elecs. Corp., No. 
1:05-CV-64 TS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97305, *15 (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010), the court 
held that a class action settlement in 1999 put “the entire computer and component 
manufacturers industry . . . on notice of a potential for litigation regarding defective 
floppy disc components . . . .”  This fact, combined with a letter defendant received from 
one of its customers—not the plaintiff—in 2000, led the court to conclude the 
preservation duty had been triggered years before the 2005 filing of suit.  Id. at *21.  
Given that certain documents had not been preserved, the court granted plaintiff an 
instruction allowing but not requiring the jury to “draw assumptions from the fact that 
[defendant] did not preserve and has not produced evidence.”  Id. at *26-27; see also 
Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (granting 
sanction “instruct[ing] the jury as to the appropriate inference to draw from the absence 
of evidence” where defendant’s employee failed to produce e-mail sent 10 days prior to 
receiving retention instructions from counsel). 
 
330 Cache La Poudre, 244 F.R.D. at 624. 
 
331 Id. at 625.  Plaintiff based its argument on the preservation duties set forth by Judge 
Scheindlin in Zubulake V.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
332 Id. at 626. 
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[77] The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s 
preservation duty encompassed conducting “‘systemwide [sic] keyword 
searches.’”334  While Judge Scheindlin suggested in Zubulake V that 
keyword searches were one way to identify responsive material, the court 
did not read her suggestion as an “immutable ‘obligation.’”335  Rather, the 
court recognized that in the “typical case, ‘[r]esponding parties are best 
situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies 
appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronic data and 
documents.”336 
 
[78] Ultimately, the court concluded defendant failed to satisfy its 
discovery obligations, primarily by failing to take independent action to 
verify the completeness of its document production, and by continuing its 
routine practice of erasing the hard drives of departed employees.337  
Consequently, the court awarded relatively minor sanctions in the amount 
of $5,000 plus deposition costs, and ordered that defendant provide certain 
additional discovery.338  In so doing, the court rejected plaintiff’s request 
for an adverse finding at trial.339 
                                                                                                                         
333 Id. at 627.  The court also was “not inclined to penalize a party for failing to approach 
former employees in an effort to respond to ‘catch-all’ or nearly indecipherable requests 
for production.”  Id. 
 
334 Id. 
 
335 Cache La Poudre, 244 F.R.D. at 627–28 (Zubulake V should not be “interpreted so 
inflexibly”). 
 
336 Id. at 628 (citing THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at 31).  The court likewise 
held that defendant acted reasonably in refusing to search inaccessible backup tapes for 
responsive information.  Id. at 628, 632. 
 
337 Id. at 630.   
 
338 Id. at 638. 
 
339 Id. at 635.  The court noted that unlike the Second Circuit, the Tenth requires a 
showing of bad faith, not mere negligence, to support an adverse inference.  Id.; cf. 
Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Mere negligence in 
losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not support an inference of 
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2. Oxford House 
 
[79] In Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, plaintiff moved to compel 
production of certain e-mails.340  Defendant argued the e-mails in question 
had been deleted and were not available.341  Defendant further put on 
evidence that the e-mails were not recoverable because its backup tapes 
were overwritten every six weeks.342  Noting the destruction occurred in 
June 2005 and defendant had not been put on notice of potential litigation 
until later that August, the court concluded defendant had no duty to 
preserve the e-mails.343  In other words, the destruction occurred before 
defendant’s duty to preserve arose.344   
 
[80] The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant should 
search for the deleted e-mails on the backup tapes.345  Initially, the court 
cited Zubulake IV for the proposition that even if the “backup tapes were 
conclusively shown to possess the deleted e-mail communications, ‘as a 
general rule, a party need not preserve all backup tapes even when it 
                                                                                                                         
consciousness of a weak case.”); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeporge Fin. Grp., 306 
F.3d 99, 108 (“The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases 
involving the negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of 
its own negligence.”). 
 
340 Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *2, 7 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 27, 2007). 
 
341 Id. at *8. 
 
342 Id. at *11.  In addition, defendant submitted an affidavit from one of its 
representatives establishing that he had not received any relevant e-mails, although two 
other persons apparently had.  Id. at *9. 
 
343 Id. at *11. 
 
344 Id. at *11. 
 
345 Oxford House, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *13-14 (noting the “small likelihood 
that such efforts would be successful”). 
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reasonably anticipates litigation.’”346  Rather, inaccessible backup tapes, 
such as those used for disaster recovery, generally are not subject to a 
litigation hold.347  The court concluded the backup tapes at issue were 
used for disaster recovery purposes and thus were not subject to a 
preservation duty.348  In any event, the court also recognized there was no 
evidence the tapes would have contained the e-mails when defendant’s 
duty to preserve arose.349   
 
[81] Relatedly, the court agreed with defendant that searching the 
backup tapes would be unduly burdensome under the circumstances.350  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the marginal utility analysis, 
assessing the likelihood the search would “produce information that is 
relevant to a claim or defense.  The greater the likelihood that it will, the 
fairer it is to require the producing party to bear the expense.”351  Here, the 
court recognized the costs of searching the backup tapes would be high,352 
while the chances of discovering relevant information were low given 
                                                 
346 Id. at *12 (citation omitted). 
 
347 Id. at *12; see also Forest Labs, Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., No. 06-4004-RDR, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31555, *11-12, *23 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2009) (ordering hearing 
to assess accessibility of backup tapes destroyed after trigger of preservation duty; if 
tapes were inaccessible, then no duty to preserve existed). 
 
348 Oxford House, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *12. 
 
349 Id. at *11. 
 
350 Id. at *14. 
 
351 Id. at *14. 
 
352 Id. at *15.  Defendant argued that an initial review of the tapes would cost at least 
$100,000.  Id.  
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defendant’s policy of continually writing over data on the tapes.353  Thus, 
the court upheld defendant’s unduly burdensome objection.354 
 
3. Doe 
 
[82] In Doe v. Norwalk Community College, the court “strongly 
disagree[d]” with defendants’ contention that their duty to preserve did not 
arise until “well after [plaintiff] filed her lawsuit in November 2004 . . . 
.”355  Rather, and in contrast to Cache La Poudre, the court concluded the 
“duty to preserve certainly arose no later than September 2004, when 
[plaintiff’s] counsel sent the defendants a demand letter . . . .”356  In fact, 
the court surmised the duty to preserve had initially arisen as early as 
February 2004, when a number of one of the defendant’s employees met 
to discuss certain of the allegations plaintiff ultimately raised in her suit.357  
By that time, “even if [plaintiff] had not yet filed her lawsuit, the 
defendants should have known that any documents, including e-mails and 
hard drives, related to [a certain defendant] could potentially be relevant to 
future litigation.”358 
 
[83] Defendants tried to rely on Rule 37(e)’s so-called “safe harbor” 
provision to excuse their destruction of electronic data after the duty to 
preserve arose, arguing that any such destruction resulted from “a neutral 
                                                 
353 Oxford House, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *15. 
 
354 Id. at *16.  Contra Disability Rights Council v. Washington Metro., 242 F.R.D. 139, 
148 (D.D.C. 2007) (ordering defendant to search backup tapes for deleted e-mails; safe 
harbor provision of Rule 37(e) did not apply where defendant failed to implement a 
litigation hold until over two years after suit was filed, leading to the deletion of 
responsive e-mails). 
 
355 Doe v. Norwalk Community College, 248 F.R.D. 372, 377 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 
356 Id. 
 
357 Id.  
 
358 Id. 
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retention system with limited resources.”359  The court, however, noted 
there was “no evidence that the defendants did anything to stop the routine 
destruction of the backup tapes after [their] obligation to preserve 
arose.”360  According to the court, to avail itself of Rule 37’s good faith 
exception, a “party needs to act affirmatively to prevent” the destruction of 
data, such as by implementing a litigation hold.361  Given that defendants 
had not done so, the court ruled they were not entitled to the protections 
afforded by Rule 37.362  Indeed, the court found “defendants’ failure to 
place a litigation hold and to preserve e-mails and hard drives relevant to 
[plaintiff’s] allegations . . . to be at least grossly negligent, if not reckless,” 
entitling plaintiff to an adverse inference instruction.363 
 
4. Treppel 
 
[84] Likewise, in Treppel v. Biovail Corp., the court concluded 
defendants’ “efforts to preserve ESI were clearly inadequate.”364  Plaintiff 
filed suit in April 2003, leading the corporate defendant’s general counsel 
in May to orally instruct key executives to preserve relevant 
information.365  The general counsel repeated the instructions in 
                                                 
359 Id.   
 
360 Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 380. 
 
361 Id. at 378.   
 
362 Id. (citation omitted). 
 
363 Id. at 379, 381. 
 
364 Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 249 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 
365 Id. at 115.  The executives, however, could not remember when they began to preserve 
information.  Id. at 121; see also Acorn v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. CV 05-2301 (JFB) 
(WDW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19459, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2009).  Defendant 
argued that it issued a “verbal hold” upon receiving service of the complaint in June 
2005.  But the court noted defendant had not provided an affidavit “indicating the timing 
of [the attorney’s] ‘verbal hold’ or to whom she relayed it.”  Id. at *8.  Further, defendant 
had not provided any evidence that the attorney “or anyone else . . . conducted any 
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December, following a letter from plaintiff’s counsel demanding that all 
relevant ESI be preserved.366  The preservation instructions were not 
issued in writing, nor did the general counsel follow up with the 
executives as to what steps they took to preserve information.367  
Defendants failed to preserve backup tapes that existed in December 2003, 
some seven months after the preservation duty attached.368  The court 
termed defendants’ preservation efforts “clearly inadequate,” relying on 
Zubulake V for the proposition that “[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps 
to monitor compliance” with a litigation hold, which failed to occur.369 
 
[85] On the question of remedy,370 the court found defendants’ 
discovery failures “negligent but not willful,” meaning plaintiff had to 
                                                                                                                         
follow-up to ensure that her instructions were being followed.”  Id.  Thus, the court 
concluded that defendant breached its duty to preserve until September 2006, when it 
issued a formal litigation hold.  Id. at *10.    
 
366 Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 115. 
 
367 Id.  The general counsel also did not take any steps to ensure that employees other 
than the executives preserved relevant information.  Id. at 118. 
 
368 Id. at 119.  While the court recognized Zubulake IV’s general rule that backup tapes 
are not required to be preserved, it went on to conclude the tapes in question should have 
been saved because they “were quite likely to contain files that were later deleted.”  Id.  
In doing so, the court did not address the accessibility of the backup tapes, nor did it 
discuss whether the defendants could “identify where particular employee documents 
[were] stored on the backup tapes,” and thus seemed to go beyond the Zubulake IV 
principles.  Id.; see Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); cf. Oxford 
House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *12 
(D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007) (noting the inaccessibility of backup tapes and finding the 
litigation hold did not apply).   
 
369 Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 118 (citation omitted). 
 
370 Generally, a “court ‘must determine the appropriate sanction based on the relative 
fault of the party against whom sanctions are sought and the prejudice suffered by the 
party seeking sanctions.’  Moreover, ‘[t]rial judges should have the leeway to tailor 
sanctions to insure that spoliator[s] do not benefit from their wrongdoing—a remedial 
purpose that is best adjusted according to the facts and evidentiary posture of each case.’”  
Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).   
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establish the missing evidence’s relevance in order to justify an adverse 
inference.371  Recognizing that plaintiff failed to do so, the court denied 
the request for an adverse inference.372  The court did, however, allow 
plaintiff to conduct a forensic search of one of defendants’ laptop 
computers, and ordered defendants to restore and conduct additional 
searches on various backup tapes.373 
 
5. Keithley 
 
[86] One of the more striking decisions awarding sanctions for the 
failure to institute a proper litigation hold is Keithley v. The Home 
Store.Com, Inc.374  In Keithley, plaintiffs argued that defendants spoliated 
“three types of evidence:  (1) source code; (2) early architectural, design 
and implementation documents; and (3) reports.”375  Generally speaking, 
                                                 
371 Id. at 122.  While positing that in certain circumstances a finding of gross negligence 
in destroying evidence can support an adverse inference, the court concluded 
“defendants’ conduct ‘[did] not rise to the egregious level seen in cases where relevance 
is determined as a matter of law.’”  Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted).  
 
372 Id. at 122-23.  Indeed, the court noted there was “little extrinsic evidence 
demonstrating that any pertinent documents at all were destroyed, let alone documents 
favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 122. 
 
373 Id. at 124. 
 
374 Keithley v. The Home Store.Com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 61741 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008).  Preliminary to its analysis, the court noted that 
it would “prefer to see [its] resources . . . directed to addressing the substantive issues of 
the case . . . rather than the collateral issue of sanctions for discovery abuse  . . . .”  Id. at 
*3-4.  But the court concluded this was “the unusual case in which [d]efendants’ conduct 
warrant[ed] stiff monetary, as well as evidentiary, sanctions.”  Id. at *4.  Indeed, the court 
termed the discovery misconduct by defendants “among the most egregious” it had seen.  
Id. at *3.  According to the court, defendants made misrepresentations to both plaintiffs 
and the court, as well as engaged in spoliation of information.  Id. 
 
375 Id. at *12.  Plaintiffs contended the spoliation prejudiced their ability to prove patent 
infringement related to a computerized system for tracking real estate information.  See 
id. at *11.  
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the court recognized the duty to preserve “extends to what the party 
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably 
likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending 
discovery request.”376  The “threshold question” in assessing spoliation 
allegations, however, is “when the duty to preserve . . . arose.”377  Here, 
the court recited that a litigant must preserve evidence it knows or should 
know is relevant to imminent litigation, or “probable” future litigation.378 
 
[87] Plaintiffs contended a July 1998 letter put defendants on notice of 
the alleged infringement.379  The court rejected this contention, as the 
letter did “not threaten litigation or even mention infringement.” 380  The 
court concluded, however, that the duty to preserve existed by August 
2001, when plaintiffs sent defendants an unambiguous demand letter.381  
Defendants, therefore, “had a duty to preserve documents well before” the 
lawsuit was filed in October 2003.382  But according to the court, whether 
the duty existed before the filing of the lawsuit was “largely academic,” 
because defendants did not implement a litigation hold “even after th[e] 
lawsuit was filed and [they] recklessly allowed the destruction of some 
relevant source code as late as 2004.”383 
                                                 
376 Id. at *13 (citations omitted). 
 
377 Id. at *15. 
 
378 Id.  By “probable,” the court meant “‘more than a possibility.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
379 Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *16. 
 
380 Id.; cf. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 622 (D. 
Colo. 2007) (involving a letter from counsel which “implied that her client . . . was 
willing to explore a negotiated resolution”). 
 
381 See Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *16.  Indeed, the court noted the duty 
“probably arose” by June 2001 based on another letter plaintiffs sent.  Id. at *16-17.   
 
382 Id. at *17. 
 
383 Id.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 64 
[88] In addition, the court stressed defendants’ concession “that there 
was no written litigation hold policy in place during any of the relevant 
time periods. . . . Nor was there any evidence, other than oral testimony, of 
what employees were told with respect to preservation of documents . . . 
.”384  According to the court, the lack of a written “litigation hold policy 
and procedures for its implementation, including timely reminders or even 
a single e-mail notice to relevant employees, exemplifie[d] [d]efendants’ 
lackadaisical attitude with respect to discovery . . . .”385   
 
[89] Coupled with the lack of a litigation hold was the defendants’ 
“egregious failure to diligently search for responsive documents,” which, 
in the court’s view, “compounded” the harm.386  For example, defendants 
“produced 480,000 files containing reports two weeks after they” 
represented to the court “that no reports existed, and approximately 
sixteen months after the [c]ourt ordered production of reports.”387  
Likewise, defendants produced an archive CD of some of the source code 
in April 2008, after having been ordered to do so in December 2006.388  
Even worse for defendants, they apparently had not previously asked the 
custodian of the CD to search for data responsive to the source code 
requests.389  Thus, the court concluded defendants “failed to adequately 
                                                 
384 Id. at *18.   
 
385 Id.; see also In re NTL, Inc. Secs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(failing to implement adequate litigation holds and issuing timely reminders was at least 
grossly negligent). 
 
386 Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *19. 
 
387 Id. at *30.  The court had previously granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel, which 
encompassed many of the allegedly spoliated documents.  See id. at *19-22. 
 
388 Id. at *41.  Unfortunately, “evidence of prior versions of source code was destroyed.”  
Id. at *34. 
 
389 See id. at *41-42.  The court was “frankly shocked” and could “fathom” no 
explanation for “why the CD was not found and produced earlier.”  Id.  
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search for and produce” relevant documents, including reports and source 
code.390 
 
[90] On the issue of remedy, the court recognized the  
 
policies underlying the spoliation sanctions are many: ‘to 
punish the spoliator, so as to ensure that it does not benefit 
from its misdeeds; to deter future misconduct; to remedy, 
or at least minimize, the evidentiary or financial damages 
caused by the spoliation; and last, but not least, to preserve 
the integrity of the judicial process and its truth-seeking 
function.’391   
 
Cataloguing defendants’ sins—they had not issued a litigation hold, had 
not adequately preserved evidence, had made material misrepresentations 
to the plaintiffs and the court, and had produced an “avalanche” of 
responsive information much later than when required—the court 
characterized their behavior as “reckless and egregious discovery 
misconduct.”392  Nevertheless, the court declined to enter a terminating 
sanction, reasoning there was “no evidence that [d]efendants engaged in 
deliberate spoliation, and dismissal is the most extreme sanction and 
would go beyond what is necessary to cure the prejudice to [p]laintiffs . . . 
.”393  The court did, however, order that an adverse inference instruction 
                                                 
390 Id. at *22.  In contrast, the court declined to impose sanctions related to discovery of 
the design and architectural documents.  Id. at *47. 
 
391 Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *6 (citations omitted).  Under its inherent 
authority, the court concluded sanctions were available “if ‘preceded by a finding of bad 
faith, or conduct tantamount to bad faith,’ such as recklessness ‘combined with an 
additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.’”  Id. at *7 
(citing Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2001)).  Rule 37 sanctions, on the 
other hand, could be triggered by mere “negligent conduct.”  Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 61741, at *7. 
 
392 Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *47-48.  
 
393 Id. at *50. 
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be given regarding spoliation of the source code data.394  In addition, the 
court awarded plaintiffs a “sizeable monetary sanction.”395  
 
6. Innis Arden 
 
[91] In Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., plaintiff failed to 
preserve soil samples and associated electronic data.396  Indeed, neither 
plaintiff nor its consultant, who gathered the samples, ever instituted a 
litigation hold.397  As a result, “all e-mail messages and draft documents 
and reports were deleted after thirty days.”398  Given there was no dispute 
                                                 
394 Id. at *50-51.  The Keithley opinion was authored by U.S. Magistrate Judge Laporte.  
Id. at *2.  Defendants objected to the report.  See Keithley v. The Homestore.com, Inc., 
629 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  The court denied the objections, with the 
exception of the adverse inference, which had been rendered moot by the grant of 
summary judgment in defendants’ favor on noninfringement and invalidity.  Id. at 974, 
978. 
 
395 Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *54.  Later, defendants moved for 
sanctions based on alleged spoliation by plaintiffs.  Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., No. 
C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92822, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008).  
While concluding that plaintiffs had engaged in misconduct, the court concluded that the 
“harsh remedy” of an adverse inference, much less terminating sanctions, would be 
“disproportionate” given the facts presented.  Id. at *20-21, *26, *28.  Specifically, the 
court noted there had been “no showing that [p]laintiffs engaged in widespread, reckless 
or intentional spoliation.”  Id. at *28.  Consequently, the court granted defendants fees 
and costs and certain additional discovery, but denied the request for terminating 
sanctions or an adverse inference.  Id. at *29-30. 
 
396 Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 335, 338 (D. Conn. 
2009).  Plaintiff brought suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), seeking to recover costs related to 
removing PCBs found on its property.  Id. at 335.  The samples in question were taken in 
anticipation of seeking reimbursement of remediation costs from neighboring landowners 
who allegedly were responsible for the contamination.  See id. at 336. 
 
397 Id. at 338. 
 
398 Id.  Likewise, “much of the original electronically stored data from the PCB analyses 
was not preserved.”  Id. 
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the soil samples and related data had not been preserved, the court looked 
to (1) whether plaintiff had a duty to preserve the materials when they 
were destroyed and, if so; (2) whether sanctions were warranted by the 
destruction and what type were justified.399 
 
[92] According to the court, plaintiff knew the soil samples were a 
“critical part of possible cost-recovery litigation, and the duty to preserve 
this evidence attached at the latest by mid-2005 . . . .”400  Interestingly, the 
court found the preservation duty arose even before the suit was filed.401  
Further, the court concluded plaintiff was responsible for the spoliation 
even though its consultant had actually destroyed the data.402 
 
[93] Turning to the appropriate remedy, the court noted the “applicable 
sanction should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and 
remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine.”403  In finding “no 
basis on which to conclude that [plaintiff] purposefully destroyed 
evidence,” the court likewise recognized “no reason [had been] offered 
why it was not feasible, either logistically or economically . . . to store the 
soil samples . . . .”404  In addition, plaintiff failed to issue any litigation 
hold “despite contemporaneously recognizing the potential negative 
                                                 
399 Id. at 339. 
 
400 Id. at 340.  In support of this finding, the court relied on plaintiff’s own documents, 
including the engagement letter with its consultant, showing that “litigation was 
reasonably anticipated from the very beginning of the investigation and remediation 
process.”  Id.  
 
401 Innis Arden, 257 F.R.D. at 339 (“[D]uty . . . attach[es] [when] ‘a party should have 
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.’” (quoting Kronisch v. 
United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998))). 
 
402 See id. at 341 (“Courts have found that an expert’s destruction of evidence can be 
attributed to its client . . . .”). 
 
403 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
404 Id. at 342-43. 
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consequences of evidence destruction.”405  Thus, according to the court, a 
“severe sanction” was “necessary.”406  While concluding that dismissal 
was unwarranted, the court likewise reasoned an adverse inference would 
be insufficient.407  Given that the “key raw ‘fingerprint’ evidence . . . 
simply no longer exists, but the party that is responsible for its destruction 
seeks to benefit from its use,” the court ruled the appropriate sanction 
would be to preclude any evidence based on the samples that plaintiff’s 
consultant had destroyed.408 
 
7. Oracle 
 
[94] Plaintiffs in Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp.409 
contended that defendants “improperly focused” their preservation efforts 
by only sending hold notices to roughly 30 of 40,000 employees.410  The 
court rejected this contention, noting “plaintiffs ha[d] not identified any 
                                                 
405 Id. at 342. 
 
406 Innis Arden, 257 F.R.D. at 342.  In particular, the court noted the prejudice defendant 
suffered, since it could not run its own tests and analysis on samples and data that no 
longer existed.  See id.  
 
407 Id. at 342-43.  The proceeding was a bench trial which, in the court’s view, rendered 
an adverse inference “somewhat awkward.”  Id. at 343.   
 
408 Id.; cf. Pinstripe, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., No. 07-CV-620-GKF-PJC, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 66422, at *8-9, *11-12 (N.D. Okla. July 28, 2009) (awarding only small monetary 
sanction and additional discovery, despite finding that defendant failed to issue litigation 
hold and failed to monitor compliance with oral retention instructions, and concluding 
that defendant’s conduct was not intentional).  
 
409 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 254 F.R.D. 559 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  
Plaintiffs alleged a number of securities fraud claims on behalf of a class of purchasers of 
Oracle stock.  See id. at 561. 
 
410 Id.  It is unclear precisely how many employees plaintiffs contended should have 
received the hold notice.  See id.  In any event, plaintiffs did not explain how discovery 
could feasibly be conducted on thousands of employees, assuming that was their goal.   
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particular documents that were not preserved as a result of defendants’ 
preservation efforts . . . .”411   
 
[95] Plaintiffs also argued the preservation process was inadequate 
because Oracle’s CEO, Larry Ellison, did not produce a significant 
number of e-mails from his files, nor notes or transcripts of interviews he 
conducted with an author on a book project.412  Here, the court found 
sanctions appropriate.413  On the e-mail issue, the court noted defendants 
only produced 15 e-mails sent or received by Mr. Ellison from his own 
files, while over 1,650 of such e-mails were produced from the files of 
other Oracle employees.414  The court disagreed with defendants’ 
contention that plaintiffs were not entitled to receive multiple copies of the 
e-mails, reasoning it “could have been helpful . . . to demonstrate that 
certain e-mails were discovered in Ellison’s files; otherwise . . . Ellison 
could argue that he never actually read or received an e-mail that was sent 
to him, and thus had no knowledge of its contents.”415  
 
[96] Further, the court faulted Mr. Ellison’s production related to the 
interviews for his book.416  While certain transcript pages were produced, 
                                                 
411 Id. at 565.  The production overall was massive, totaling some 2.1 million documents.  
In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 386 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 
412 Oracle, 254 F.R.D. at 561-62.  Mr. Ellison received the hold notice.  Id. at 561. 
 
413 Id. at 565. 
 
414 Id. 
 
415 Id.  This proposition seems dubious.  Whether a particular e-mail is produced from the 
alleged recipient’s files or somewhere else, the recipient could always argue that he did 
not read the e-mail in question.  In any event, requiring production of every recipient’s 
copy of a particular e-mail contravenes the direction of Zubulake IV that a party need not 
maintain “multiple identical copies” of relevant documents or “every shred of paper, 
every e-mail or electronic document . . . .”  Zubulake  IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 
416 Oracle, 254 F.R.D. at 566.   
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many others were not, apparently because the author destroyed the 
materials in question.417  The court rejected Mr. Ellison’s argument that he 
did not have possession or custody of the interview materials, noting he 
had a contractual right to exercise “authority over the materials and the 
ability to preserve them . . . .”418  Given that Mr. Ellison “knew of the 
litigation at the time most interviews were conducted, and failed to take 
any efforts to preserve the materials despite his obligation to do so,” the 
court ruled sanctions were warranted.419  Accordingly, the court granted 
plaintiffs an adverse inference regarding Mr. Ellison’s e-mails and the 
interview materials related to the book.420    
 
8. Green 
 
[97] In Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., plaintiff sought spoliation sanctions 
several years after losing a jury trial.421  Defendant had a single employee 
who was responsible for searching for and gathering documents relevant 
                                                 
417 Id. 
 
418 Id. at 566-67. 
 
419 Id. at 566. 
 
420 Id. at 567.  Specifically, the court ruled plaintiffs “would be entitled to an inference 
that the spoliated evidence would demonstrate Ellison’s knowledge of any material facts 
that [p]laintiffs could otherwise establish.”  In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig, 627 F.3d 376, 
385 (9th Cir. 2010).  Ultimately, the court nevertheless granted summary judgment in 
defendants’ favor.  Id. at 395.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s 
contention that the adverse inferences should have been applied to “defeat a challenge to 
the insufficiency of their prima facie case.”  Id. at 386.  
 
421 Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-372 (TJW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353, 
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011).  Plaintiff’s suit involved a product liability claim alleging 
that a gas can manufactured by defendant caused the death of plaintiff’s relative.  Id.  
Plaintiff claimed the gas tank should have contained a flame arrester; defendant 
contended it did not because flame arresters are ineffective.  Id.  Discovery in a related 
case revealed documents which plaintiff contended related to this issue and should have 
been produced in her case, leading to the spoliation motion.  Id. at *4-5. 
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to the litigation.422  The employee, however, did “not institute a litigation-
hold of documents, do any electronic word searches for e-mails, or talk 
with the IT department regarding how to search for electronic 
documents.”423  Consequently, plaintiff “identifie[d] numerous documents 
not produced in [her] case that [were] extremely relevant and material.”424   
 
[98] The court found that “any competent electronic discovery effort 
would have located” the documents in question.425  Moreover, defendant’s 
IT department had the “ability to do electronic word searches for e-mails, 
[yet] no word search was ever done.”426  In fact, the employee in charge of 
defendant’s discovery efforts “readily admit[ted] that ‘I am about as 
computer . . . illiterate as they [sic] get.’”427  Thus, the court concluded 
that defendant “made little, if any, effort to discharge its electronic 
discovery obligations . . . [and] also failed to preserve its electronic 
documents.”428  Even more damning, the court found defendant “actually 
asked its employees to routinely delete electronic documents,” at a time 
when it was defending multiple product liability lawsuits and had a 
preservation duty.429 
                                                 
422 Id. at *11. 
 
423 Id. at *14; see also In re A&M Fla. Props. II, No. 09-15173 (AJG), 2010 Bankr. 
LEXIS 1217, at *20, *21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2010) (granting monetary sanction against 
plaintiff and counsel where ESI was produced late due to failure to timely identify all 
sources of information).   
 
424 Green, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353, at *14.  For instance, plaintiff identified 
numerous documents including e-mails from discovery in another case that related to the 
flame arrester issue.  See id. at *14-18.  
 
425 Id. at *20. 
 
426 Id. at *21. 
 
427 Id. at *20-21.  As the court noted, “[t]hat [defendant] put someone in charge of its 
discovery who knows nothing about computers does not help [its] effort to show that it 
was reasonable in its discovery obligations.”  Id. at *21 n.5. 
 
428 Id. at *26. 
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[99] Based on the foregoing, the court issued a harsh—and creative—
sanction:  (1) it ordered defendant to pay $250,000 to compensate plaintiff 
for losses caused by defendant’s serial discovery violations; (2) it also 
gave defendant thirty days to provide a copy of the court’s order to every 
plaintiff in every lawsuit pending against it and that had been pending 
against it in the previous two years; (3) the court ordered an additional 
$500,000 fine that would extinguish upon the defendant’s certification of 
compliance with the foregoing provision; and (3) the court ordered that for 
the five subsequent years, for every new lawsuit that defendant would be a 
party to (whether plaintiff or defendant), it must file a copy of the court’s 
order with its initial pleading or filing.430 
 
B. Scope of Preservation—Reasonable Accessibility and 
Proportionality 
 
1. Café Asia 
 
[100] In Smith v. Café Asia, defendant moved to compel production of 
certain images stored on plaintiff’s cell phone.431  Defendant argued the 
images would rebut plaintiff’s claim that he was subjected to a hostile 
work environment due to his sexual orientation.432  While recognizing the 
broad scope of discovery, the court nevertheless noted that “relevancy 
                                                                                                                         
429 Green, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353, at *26-27.  Defendant also recycled its backup 
tapes every two weeks, meaning the deleted e-mails were permanently lost.  Id. at *29.  
Thus, the court concluded “it [would] never be known how much prejudice against the 
plaintiff was actually caused by [defendant’s] failure to preserve documents.”  Id. 
 
430 Id. at *33-36. 
 
431 Smith v. Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. 19, 19 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 
432 Id. at 20.  Plaintiff conceded that “his cell phone contain[ed] ‘intimate, highly 
personal’ and ‘unclothed images’ . . . but denie[d] having willingly shared the images 
with his co-workers.”  Id.  Defendant, on the other hand, argued that the “images [were] 
relevant to whether plaintiff invited a hostile work environment and whether he was 
subjectively offended by defendant’s alleged conduct.”  Id.     
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alone does not entitle a requesting party to carte blanche in discovery.”433  
Rather, according to the court, “[o]ne important constraint is the 
admissibility of the discovery being sought.”434  Thus, even though 
information ultimately held inadmissible at trial may still be discoverable, 
this “holds true . . . only if the [information] ‘appear[s] reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”435   
 
[101] Accordingly, the court determined that “the question of 
discoverability is inseparable from admissibility,” and thus it had to 
examine whether the information’s probative value was substantially 
outweighed by its unfair prejudice.436  The court therefore ordered that the 
images be preserved pending a ruling on their admissibility by the trial 
judge.437  In addition, the court ordered that plaintiff permit one attorney 
designated by defendant to inspect the images so defendant could make an 
informed argument regarding their admissibility.438 
 
2. Columbia Pictures 
 
[102] In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court addressed the 
“following question of first impression:  is the information held in a 
computer’s random access memory (RAM) ‘electronically stored 
information’ under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34?”439  Defendants 
                                                 
433 Id.  
 
434 Id.  In this regard, the court noted “[a]s with most things in life, Rule 26 is not an all-
or-nothing proposition.”  Id. 
 
435 Id. at 20 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)). 
 
436 Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. at 20.  For an extensive discussion of the admissibility of ESI, 
see generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
437 Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. at 20-21.   
 
438 Id. at 21. 
 
439 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  In 
Columbia Pictures, plaintiffs were “motion picture studios that own[ed] copyrights or 
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argued that ESI “cannot include information held in RAM because the 
period of storage, which may be as much as six hours, is too 
temporary.”440  The court disagreed, finding it undisputed that 
 
RAM is computer memory and that information held in 
RAM is held there for later use by the computer (e.g., to be 
used in tasks performed by software or written to a hard 
drive, flash drive, DVD, or other more permanent medium) 
or disposal (e.g., to be erased when the computer is turned 
off or when the data is overwritten with new information as 
part of the regular computing process).441   
 
Further, the court noted that RAM “itself is defined as a storage unit . . . 
and . . . is typically used as the computer’s primary storage . . . .”442  Thus, 
according to the court, “information held in RAM is ‘stored’ under the 
plain meaning of the unambiguous language of Rule 34.”443   
 
[103] Leaving aside the plain language of Rule 34, the court further 
noted the definition of ESI was meant to “be read expansively to include 
all current and future electronic storage mediums . . . .”444  Since Rule 34’s 
                                                                                                                         
exclusive reproduction and distribution rights to numerous movies and television 
programs.”  Id. at 445.  Plaintiffs claimed that defendants operated a website that 
allegedly permitted “Internet users to locate and download, view, store, and distribute 
unauthorized copies of Plaintiffs” works.  Id.  Plaintiffs sought discovery of server log 
data, which included, inter alia, “the anonymous (masked or encrypted) Internet Protocol 
(IP) address of users of Defendants’ website . . . .”  Id. at 447 n.3.  The server log data 
could be copied from defendants’ computers and produced to plaintiffs.  Id. at 447.  
 
440 Id. at 446. 
 
441 Id.  
 
442 Id. at 447. 
 
443 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (allowing discovery of any “electronically stored 
information . . . stored in any medium from which information can be obtained . . .”). 
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scope was meant to be as “broad as possible,” the court saw “no room to 
interpret the Rule to categorically exclude information written in a 
particular medium simply because that medium stores information only 
temporarily.”445  Accordingly, the court ordered discovery of the RAM in 
question.446 
 
3. Parkdale America 
 
[104] Competing motions to compel and for a protective order related to 
the discovery of ESI were at issue in Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers 
Casualty & Surety Co.447  Specifically, defendant sought discovery of 
“internal e-mails, memoranda and files relating to [plaintiffs’] claims for 
insurance coverage . . . .”448  Plaintiffs objected, arguing the e-mails were 
not reasonably accessible and producing them would constitute an undue 
burden and expense, particularly to review for privilege.449  The court 
disagreed, noting the “disputed e-mails are presently in LotusNotes 
format, rather than in a less accessible backup media.”450  Further, 
                                                                                                                         
444 Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 447 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s 
notes). 
 
445 Id. at 447.  On the contrary, “Rule 34 requires no greater degree of permanency from a 
medium than that which makes obtaining the data possible.”  Id. 
 
446 Id.  
 
447 See Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 88820, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007).  The primary claim in the suit 
sought a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to an insurance contract, defendant owed a 
defense and indemnity obligation to plaintiffs for ten underlying antitrust lawsuits.  Id. at 
*2.   
 
448 Id. at *11.  The plaintiffs had previously produced the e-mails of one of their alleged 
officers.  Id. at *5, *24-25.  The parties had shared the cost of this production.  Id. at *25.  
Defendants then sought e-mails from certain other of plaintiffs’ officers or employees.  
Id. 
 
449 Id. at *34.  
 
450 Id. at *35.   
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considering the “amount in controversy[,] . . . the parties’ apparent 
resources, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving 
critical factual issues,” the court concluded plaintiffs had “not articulated a 
sufficient basis to relieve them of the obligation to produce [the] e-
mails.”451  The court went on to order that plaintiffs should make a good 
faith effort to apportion costs of the production with defendant and, failing 
that, could move for an order allocating costs pursuant to Zubulake I.452 
 
4. Heartland Surgical 
 
[105] The court in Heartland Surgical Specialty Hospital v. Midwest 
Division, Inc. resolved a dispute over the burdensomeness of searching 
personal e-mail accounts subject to a subpoena.453  The respondents to the 
                                                 
451 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  Notably, plaintiffs had not offered a specific 
cost estimate for producing the relevant e-mails.  See Parkdale Am., 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88820, at *35. 
 
452 Parkdale Am., 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 88820, at *40.  In leaving open the possibility of 
cost-shifting, the court appeared to go beyond the strictures of FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(B), which permits conditions on discovery after a showing of inaccessibility 
(and after good cause is shown).  See, e.g., Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. 
Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009) (defendants failed to identify “which documents 
[were] inaccessible or the nature of that inaccessibility” and thus “fail[ed] to provide any 
grounds for shifting costs . . . .”); Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer 
Human Res. Consulting, Inc., No. 05-CV-74326, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52169, at *4-5 
(E.D. Mich. July 19, 2007) (granting motion to strike order that plaintiffs would bear cost 
of restoring electronic data, as it was not clear that magistrate “engaged in the proper 
analysis before shifting the cost of discovery to plaintiffs”).  Here, again, the court 
concluded that the subject e-mails were not reasonably inaccessible, and ordinarily a 
party bears its own costs in responding to discovery requests.  See Parkdale Am., LLC, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88820, at *35; Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 
358 (1978). 
 
453 Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp. v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164-MLB-DWB, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53217 (D. Kan. July 20, 2007).  The subpoena at issue concerned 
certain physicians who were founders of a hospital.  Id. at *5.  The founders were not 
parties to the antitrust and tortious interference suit filed by the hospital, although they 
had a financial interest in the outcome.  See id. at *6, *18.    
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subpoena argued that searching their personal e-mail accounts would be 
unduly burdensome, given that the plaintiff had already produced all e-
mails found on business accounts maintained by the respondents.454  
Defendant, on the other hand, contended that respondents may have 
destroyed some ESI, based on testimony that certain respondents had 
never seen the subpoena, searched for the requested documents, nor 
directed anyone else to conduct such a search.455  The court, however, 
reasoned that the respondents were “undoubtedly busy physicians who 
[were] engaged in daily activities that require[d] their full attention,” and 
thus concluded that “they may have not recalled or remembered 
specifically what was done about the subject subpoenas.”456  The court 
therefore ruled the respondents had not “intentionally failed to comply” 
with the subpoenas, nor “acted in a grossly negligent manner.”457  
[106] On the discoverability of information from the personal e-mail 
accounts, it was “bothersome to the [c]ourt that no attempt at all was made 
by some of the [respondents] to search, even on a random basis, their 
personal or office e-mails.”458  Nevertheless, the court recognized that 
many of the remaining documents in dispute were not the type that “could 
reasonably be expected to be found through an e-mail search.”459  
Applying Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality analysis, the court reasoned 
that searching the personal e-mail accounts was not likely to discover any 
                                                 
454 See id. at *22. 
 
455 See id. at *42-43. 
 
456 Id. at *43. 
 
457 Id.  
 
458 Heartland Surgical, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53217, at *45.  On the other hand, the 
court noted that respondents had already produced all e-mails sent to their business 
addresses.  Id.  
 
459 Id. at *46. 
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documents that had not already been produced.460  Thus, the court ruled it 
would not require searches of the personal e-mail accounts.461 
 
5. Oracle 
 
[107] The court in Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG analyzed Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s 
proportionality standard.462  Defendants proposed that discrete document 
searches be limited to no more than 115 custodians.463  Plaintiffs, 
conversely, argued for searches involving up to 165 custodians.464  
Defendants argued that the burden and expense would outweigh any 
potential benefit, noting the requested additional searches would cost 
approximately $16.5 million.465  In response, plaintiffs contended the 
additional searches were justified by the stakes of the case, which 
amounted to potentially hundreds of millions if not a billion dollars.466  At 
the same time, however, plaintiffs “did not propose shifting any part of 
these enormous costs to them[selves].”467    
 
                                                 
460 See id. at *44-45, *47; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 
461 Heartland Surgical, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53217, at *47. 
 
462 Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, No. C-07-01658 PJH (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319 
(N.D. Cal. July 3, 2008).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants “engaged in serious 
intellectual property violations through extensive illegal downloads,” leading to the theft 
of “‘many hundreds’ of customers . . . .”  Id. at *4.    
 
463 Id. at *3.  Searches would also be run against centralized repositories.  Id. at *2. 
 
464 Id. at *3. 
 
465 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  Defendants also argued that because of the 
volume of information the additional searches could impact the discovery deadline as 
well as the trial date.  Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *5. 
 
466 Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *4. 
 
467 Id. at *5. 
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[108] In assessing proportionality, the court recognized that cost “is only 
one consideration among many . . . .”468  But the court would “not 
condone forcing [d]efendants to expend $16.5 million on custodial 
searches for just one aspect of what [would] undoubtedly be extensive 
discovery in” the case.469  More fundamentally, the court recognized that 
it had to apply the discovery rules “in accordance with the wise mandate 
of Rule 1:  ‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.’”470  The mere fact that the case, like many federal cases, 
involved significant public policy issues, and that defendants possessed 
significant resources, did not dissuade the court.471  Rather, according to 
the court, requiring parties to  
 
expend many millions of dollars on discovery in each 
lawsuit that fits this profile because of the explosion in the 
amount and types of [ESI] . . . [would lead to businesses 
being] mired in exorbitantly costly litigation where the 
process of discovery becomes so onerous and prohibitively 
expensive that it no longer facilitates resolution on the 
merits as a means to an end, but dominates and derails the 
litigation process.472   
 
                                                 
468 Id. at *6. 
 
469 Id. 
 
470 Id.   
 
471 See Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *6-7.  
 
472 Id. at *7.  Indeed, there has been much study and commentary on this “vanishing trial” 
phenomenon, which is no doubt related at least in part to the increasing costs of litigation, 
specifically discovery.  See Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 30 LITIG. ONLINE 2, 3 
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/litigation_ 
journal/04winter_openingstatement.authcheckdam.pdf (“Discovery is too broad, takes 
too much time, and costs the parties too much money.”).  These expenses are exacerbated 
by the increasing emphasis on e-discovery.  See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 
F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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As evidence, the court noted that not only would the discovery sought 
“run afoul of the deadlines set by the trial judge,” it would also likely 
“produce an avalanche of information that could not be presented to a jury 
in a manner and time frame that it could digest.”473 Thus, the court 
concluded that discovery would be limited to 120 custodians.474  
 
6. Mancia 
 
[109] In Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., Magistrate Judge 
Grimm wrestled with the concepts of cooperation and proportionality as 
mandated by Rule 26.475  While prosecuting a collective action seeking 
allegedly unpaid overtime and other wages, plaintiffs propounded a 
number of broad discovery requests.476  Defendants’ objections triggered a 
motion to compel.477  The court began its analysis with “[o]ne of the most 
important, but apparently least understood or followed, of the discovery 
rules . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g),” which requires that “every discovery 
disclosure, request, response or objection must be signed by at least one 
attorney of record, or the client, if unrepresented.”478  This signature 
“‘certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after a reasonable inquiry,’ the disclosure is complete and 
correct, and that the discovery request, response or objection is,” inter 
alia, “not interposed for any improper purpose (such as to harass, cause 
                                                 
473 Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *7. 
 
474 Id. 
 
475 See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 356-57 (D. Md. 2008). 
 
476 See id. at 355-56.  The requests sought relevant e-mails and other documents.  Id. at 
364. 
 
477 See id. at 355-56.  As a preliminary matter, the court noted an “obvious violation” of 
FED. R. OF CIV. PROC. 33(b)(4) in that defendants’ objections were not stated “with 
specificity.”  Id. at 356.  
 
478 Id. at 357 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)). 
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unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation) . . . .”479  
Further, the signer certifies that the requests, etc. are “neither unreasonable 
nor unduly burdensome or expensive (considering the needs of the case, 
prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance 
of the issues at stake in the action).”480 
 
[110] The court noted a number of “important ‘take away points’ [from 
Rule 26(g)] that ought to, but unfortunately do not, regulate the way 
discovery is conducted.”481  First, according to the court,  
 
the rule is intended to impose an ‘affirmative duty’ on 
counsel to behave responsibly during discovery, and to 
ensure that it is conducted in a way that is consistent ‘with 
the spirit and purposes’ of the discovery rules, which  . . . 
requires cooperation by counsel to identify and fulfill 
legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid seeking discovery the 
cost and burden of which is disproportionately large to 
what is at stake in the litigation.482   
 
Second, the “rule is intended to curb discovery abuse by requiring the 
court to impose sanctions if it is violated, absent ‘substantial justification,’ 
and those sanctions are intended both to penalize the noncompliant lawyer 
or unrepresented client, and to deter others from noncompliance.”483  
Third, the “rule aspires to eliminate one of the most prevalent of all 
                                                 
479 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(A), (B)(i)-(ii)). 
 
480 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii)). 
 
481 Id. 
 
482 Id. at 357-58. 
 
483 Id. at 358. 
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discovery abuses:  kneejerk discovery requests served without 
consideration of cost or burden to the responding party.”484   
[111] Working in tandem is Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality test, 
under which a court has an obligation, sua sponte, to limit discovery 
where the burden or expense outweighs its likely benefit, “considering the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues.”485  The court recognized the reality, 
however, that with “certain discovery, principally interrogatories and 
document production requests, lawyers customarily serve requests that are 
far broader, more redundant and burdensome than necessary . . . .”486  This 
“failure to engage in discovery as required by Rule 26(g) is one reason 
why the cost of discovery is so widely criticized as being excessive—to 
the point of pricing litigants out of court.”487  As a result, “[d]eserving 
cases are not brought because the cost of pursuing them fails a rational 
cost-benefit test, while meritless cases, especially smaller cases, are being 
settled rather than being tried because it costs too much to litigate 
them.”488  E-discovery, of course, exacerbates the problem of discovery 
                                                 
484 Id.  The court also noted that Rule 26(g) was meant to end the “equally abusive 
practice of objecting to discovery requests reflexively—but not reflectively—and without 
a factual basis.”  Id.  Specifically, the court recognized that “boilerplate objections that a 
request for discovery is ‘overbroad and unduly burdensome, and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of material admissible in evidence,’ persist despite a 
litany of decisions from courts, including this one, that such objections are improper 
unless based on particularized facts.”  Id. (citations omitted).  In fact, according to the 
court, “the very act of making such boilerplate objections is prima facie evidence of a 
Rule 26(g) violation . . . .”  Id. at 359.  
 
485 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)). 
 
486 Id. at 358.   
 
487 Id. at 359. 
 
488 Id. (quoting AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008)). 
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costs, and “is partly responsible for making federal litigation ‘procedurally 
more complex, risky to prosecute, and very expensive . . . .’”489   
[112] The court disputed the notion there is anything inherent in our 
adversary system “that precludes cooperation between the parties and their 
attorneys during the litigation process to achieve orderly and cost effective 
discovery . . . .”490  In this regard, the court may have overlooked the 
incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel, in class or other complex litigation, to 
run up their opponent’s discovery costs in hopes of extracting a settlement, 
whatever the merits of the case.491  Thus, while a “lawyer who seeks 
excessive discovery given what is at stake in the litigation, . . . or pursues 
discovery in order to make the cost for his or her adversary so great that 
the case settles to avoid the transaction costs” may well be “hindering the 
adjudication process,” the court ignored that to such lawyers this is a 
feature of the system–not a bug.492 
 
[113] The court concluded that a number of defendants’ objections were 
“boilerplate” and “non-particularized,” and thus violated Rule 33.493  At 
the same time, the court noted that much of the discovery propounded by 
                                                 
489 Id. at 359 (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Trial Balloon:  Federal Litigation—Where Did 
It Go off Track?, 34 LITIG. 5, 62 (2008) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
490 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 360-61 (noting further that “[t]he apparent ineffectiveness of 
Rule 26(g) in changing the way discovery is in fact practiced often is excused by arguing 
that the cooperation that judges expect during discovery is unrealistic because it is at odds 
with the demands of the adversary system . . . .  But this is just not so.”). 
 
491 See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(recognizing that corporate defendants typically have “much more extensive” records 
than class action plaintiffs, and noting propensity of the latter to “want to rummage in 
quest for smoking guns”). 
 
492 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 362; see Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 850, 855-56 (noting that 
although merit of case was “slight,” pressure to settle would “mount up if class counsel’s 
ambitious program of discovery is allowed to continue”). 
 
493 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 363-64. The court explained that defendants’ failure to make 
timely, specific objections waived any legitimate objection that existed.  See id. at 364. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 84 
plaintiffs “might be excessive or overly burdensome, given the nature of 
[the] case, the few number of named Plaintiffs and the relatively modest 
amounts of wages claimed for each.”494  Thus, the court ordered the 
parties to meet and confer and “attempt to identify a foreseeable range of 
damages” in an effort to determine the value of the case, which would then 
inform a “workable ‘discovery budget’ that is proportional to what is at 
issue in the case.”495  The parties were then to  
 
discuss the amount and type of discovery already provided, 
and  . . . the additional discovery still sought by Plaintiffs, 
in order to evaluate the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) factors, to 
determine whether Plaintiffs’ legitimate additional 
discovery needs could be fulfilled from non-duplicative, 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive 
sources than those currently sought . . . .496   
 
If the parties were unable to reach agreement on the additional requested 
discovery, the court would then rule based on the factors discussed 
previously.497 
 
C. Search Methodology—No Routine Access to Opponent’s 
Systems 
 
1. Scotts 
 
[114] In The Scotts Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,498 
plaintiff moved to compel an order that “would require defendant to allow 
                                                 
494 Id. 
 
495 Id.  This admittedly “rough estimate” would also include plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees 
assuming they prevailed.  Id. 
 
496 Id. 
 
497 Id. at 365. 
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a forensic expert to search defendant’s computer systems, network servers 
and databases and would require defendant to provide backup tapes of 
certain information systems to include data for the last nine years.”499  The 
court, however, denied the motion, reasoning the amendments to Rule 34 
“simply clarif[ied] ‘that discovery of [ESI] stands on equal footing with 
discovery of paper documents.’”500  Thus, “without a qualifying reason, 
plaintiff is no more entitled to access to defendant’s electronic information 
storage systems than to defendant’s warehouses storing paper 
documents.”501  As to whether plaintiff had a sufficient reason for the 
motion, the court concluded not—the motion was based on “mere 
suspicion,” and “speculation [was], in the view of this court, entirely 
insufficient.”502  
 
2. Ferron 
 
[115] In Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C.,503 the court found “qualifying 
reasons sufficient to permit [d]efendants access to [p]laintiff’s computer 
                                                                                                                         
498 Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43005 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007). 
 
499 Id. at *4.  Plaintiff contended that the 2006 amendments to Rule 34 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure supported its motion.  Id.  
 
500 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes). 
 
501 Id. at *5; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes (“[Revised Rule 34] 
is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information 
system.”). 
 
502 Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *6; see also Williams v. Massachusetts Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 144, 146 (D. Mass. 2005) (denying motion to appoint computer 
forensic expert where movant failed to show “that Defendants are unwilling to produce 
computer-generated documents”); Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329-30 (D.D.C. 
2003) (denying motion to compel because “inspection or seizure [of ESI] is not permitted 
unless the moving party can ‘demonstrate that the documents they seek to compel do, in 
fact, exist and are being unlawfully withheld’” (citation omitted)).   
 
503 John W. Ferron v. Search Cactus LLC, No. 2:06-cv-327, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34599 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008). 
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systems” that had been absent in Scotts.504   Specifically, the court 
concluded plaintiff had not properly implemented a litigation hold.505  In 
addition, the court noted that plaintiff had not produced the requested 
information and his computers “contain[ed] the only available 
documentary evidence of his visits to the websites in issue . . . .”506  Given 
plaintiff had not previously produced the information, the court 
distinguished Scotts on the basis that defendants did not seek the re-
production of ESI but rather sought information that plaintiff should 
already have preserved and produced.507  Accordingly, the court ordered 
that plaintiff allow defendants’ forensic computer expert to image his hard 
drives.508 
 
3. Adams 
 
[116] In Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Fujitsu Ltd., the court 
applied the general rule that the 2006 amendments did not create a routine 
right of access to an opponent’s systems, but did find sampling 
                                                 
504 Id. at *8; see supra note 501 and accompanying text. 
 
505 Ferron, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34599, at *8-9.  Defendants sought discovery of e-
mails received and websites visited by plaintiff, which formed  the basis of his consumer 
fraud claim.  Id. at *2. 
 
506 Id. at *8. 
 
507 Id.; see also Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:05-cv-734, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48551, *10-11 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2006).   
 
508 Ferron, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34599, at *13-14.  Other courts have allowed access to 
a party’s computer systems where some type of discovery misconduct can be shown.  
See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (allowing access to party’s 
computer system based on showing of systemic deletion of relevant emails); Ameriwood 
Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380, *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) 
(granting motion to compel imaging of defendant’s hard drive where court had “cause to 
question whether defendants have produced all responsive documents”); cf. In re Ford 
Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[w]hile some kind of direct access [to 
systems] might be permissible in certain cases,” a necessary prerequisite would be “a 
factual finding of some non-compliance with discovery rules”).  
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appropriate.509  Defendant contended that relevant data was located on old 
computers that plaintiffs had not previously searched.510  Plaintiff, in 
response, claimed that it would take hundreds of hours to search all the 
computers at issue and, in any event, he had used those computers to 
produce archives from which his production came.511 
 
[117] Noting the parties “dr[ew] opposite conclusions” on the sufficiency 
of plaintiff’s initial search, the court was “unable to determine” whether 
the burden of making plaintiff conduct additional searches on the old 
computers would outweigh the likely benefit.512  To inform this analysis, 
the court ordered plaintiff to produce an inventory of his old computers.513  
Defendant could then select one computer from the list and require 
plaintiff to produce the directories and file structure for that computer.514  
If this sampling revealed “something significant,” defendant could move 
for further discovery.515  
 
                                                 
509 See Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-64, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45576,  at *24-25 (D. Utah May 10, 2010).  In Adams, defendant sought an 
order compelling disclosure of ESI in native format, including metadata and file trees 
found on plaintiff’s computers.  See id. at *16.  
 
510 Id. at *22. 
 
511 Id. 
 
512 Id. at *23 
 
513 Id. at *24.  The inventory included the “computer make and model; serial number; 
storage devices and capacity of the storage devices associated with the computer; dates 
the computer was in service; by whom it was used; a general description of the uses of 
the computer; any archive or backup related to the computer; a summary of the type of 
data on the computer; and the current location and custodian of the computer.”  Id.  
 
514 Adams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45576, at *25.  If plaintiff identified ten or more 
computers, then defendant would be entitled to select two computers for further 
examination.  Id. 
 
515 Id.  
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4. Ford 
 
[118] Pointing to a “noticeable absence” of relevant documents in its 
opponent’s production, defendant in Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood 
Properties, Inc. requested access to plaintiff’s systems to run “narrowly 
tailored key word search[es] . . . .”516  Plaintiff’s production was based on 
a “manual document collection process,” rather than electronic searches, 
which the court recognized was “not necessarily contemplated under the 
Sedona Principles . . . .”517  At the same time, however, the court noted the 
responding party is presumed to be “in the best position to choose an 
appropriate method of searching and culling data.”518  Rejecting 
defendant’s “conclusory allegation” that it had “not received all of the 
documents to which it is entitled,”519 the court ruled that “reinventing the 
wheel,” i.e., allowing access for electronic searches to test the efficacy of 
the prior manual searches, would be unduly burdensome to plaintiff.520  
Given that defendant had not made a “colorable showing” that plaintiff 
had either intentionally or negligently withheld documents, and that a 
subjective belief that “documents must exist simply is not enough” to 
require further discovery, the court denied the motion to compel.521   
                                                 
516 Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 427 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 
517 Id.; see The Sedona Conference Working Grp. on Best Practices for Document 
Retention and Prod., The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of 
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 195 
(2007) [hereinafter Sedona Best Practices Commentary]. 
 
518 Ford, 257 F.R.D. at 427 (quoting Sedona Best Practices Commentary, supra note 517, 
at 195) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
519 Id. at 427.  Indeed, the court noted that such “nefarious speculation has not moved 
several courts, nor will it move this one, to grant burdensome discovery requests late in 
the game.”  Id. 
 
520 Id. 
 
521 Id. at 428.  The court did note that if subsequent depositions revealed the existence of 
unproduced documents defendant could then move for appropriate relief.  Id. 
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5. Bank of Mongolia 
 
[119] In Bank of Mongolia v. M&P Global Financial Services, Inc., 
defendants failed to timely respond to document requests or produce 
responsive documents.522  Plaintiff then sought “access to [d]efendants’ 
electronic records and computer hardware” to conduct searches.523  At the 
hearing on plaintiff’s motion, defendants conceded they had not yet 
searched their electronic data and requested additional time for their expert 
to do so.524  The court, however, denied this request, “in view of the . . . 
[d]efendants’ past lack of response to [p]laintiff’s request for information . 
. . .”525  Instead, the court concluded that “an independent expert should be 
appointed to retrieve any deleted responsive files from [d]efendants’ 
computers.”526  In denying plaintiff’s request for direct access to 
defendants’ systems, the court reasoned that the “failure to adequately 
respond to [p]laintiff’s request for documents is not sufficient grounds to 
give [p]laintiff unfettered access to [d]efendants’ computer system.”527       
 
 
                                                 
522 Bank of Mongolia v. M&P Global Financial Servs., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 514, 516 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
 
523 Id. at 517. 
 
524 Id. 
 
525 Id. at 520. 
 
526 Id.  The independent expert would create a mirror image of defendants’ systems.  Id.  
The expert would then use terms agreed to by the parties (with the court resolving any 
disputes) to search the mirror image results.  Id. at 521.  Plaintiff was ordered to pay the 
cost of employing the expert, although the court agreed to revisit the issue if evidence of 
spoliation by the defendants turned up.  Id. The court also ordered that defendants pay 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees associated with bringing the motion, a total of $3,400.  Id. at 
522.  
 
527 Bank of Mongolia, 258 F.R.D. at 521; see also In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 
1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 34(a) does not grant unrestricted, direct access to a 
respondent’s database compilations.”). 
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D. Search Methodology—Keywords Challenged 
 
1. O’Keefe 
 
[120] Defendants attempted to challenge the suitability of certain search 
terms in United States v. O’Keefe.528  The court reasoned that “[w]hether 
search terms or ‘keywords’ will yield the information sought is a 
complicated question involving the interplay, at least, of the sciences of 
computer technology, statistics and linguistics.”529  As a result, according 
to the court, “for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search 
term or terms would be more likely to produce the information than the 
terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.”530  Because 
the suitability of particular keywords is “clearly beyond the ken of a 
layman,” the court concluded “that any such conclusion [would have to] 
be based on evidence that . . . meets the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”531  Accordingly, the court directed that if defendants 
                                                 
528 See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2008).  O’Keefe 
involved criminal charges alleging one defendant, a former State Department employee, 
expedited visa requests in exchange for gifts and other improper benefits.  Id. at 15-16.  
Though the proceeding was criminal, the court applied the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, noting the criminal rules did not address the document production issues 
presented.  See id. at 18-19.  In the court’s view, it would have been “foolish” to ignore 
the Rules “merely because this is a criminal case.” Rather, it was “far better to use these 
rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production of documents in criminal and civil 
cases raises the same problems.”  Id. at 19.    
 
529 Id. at 24. 
 
530 Id.; cf. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., No. CV 
2007-4027 (ENV)(MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 
2009) (directing defendants to provide their opponent with “a list of the employees or 
former employees whose e-mails they want searched and the specific search terms to be 
used for each individual”).  
 
531 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 24.  Rule 702 provides that a “witness who is qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify in the form 
of an opinion . . . if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”  FED. 
R. EVID. 702. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 91 
wanted to challenge the search terms used, they must file a motion to 
compel “based on evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 702 . . . 
.”532 
 
2. Equity Analytics 
 
[121] Similarly, in Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, decided by the same 
Magistrate Judge as O’Keefe,533 in considering a dispute as to the efficacy 
of search terms the court ordered the challenger’s expert to submit an 
affidavit detailing his concerns with the terms proposed.534  In doing so, 
the court again emphasized that “determining whether a particular search 
methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective certainly 
requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) and 
requires expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 . . . .”535     
 
3. Victor Stanley I 
 
[122] In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.(Victor Stanley I), 
plaintiff argued that 165 electronic documents produced by defendants 
“occurred under circumstances that waived any privilege or protected 
status.”536  In concluding that any privilege had indeed been waived, 
Magistrate Judge Grimm delved into the search methodologies employed 
                                                 
532 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
 
533 United States Magistrate Judge Facciola.  See O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 14; Equity 
Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 
534 Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. at 333. 
 
535 Id.  The court conceded the efficacy of the “contemplated forensic search . . . [was] 
beyond any experience or knowledge I can claim.”  Id.; see also Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. 
EPA, No. 08-1332 (EGS/JMF), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37182, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 
2009) (noting that “keyword searches are no longer the favored methodology” and 
ordering that party conduct another search using additional keywords). 
 
536 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley I), 250 F.R.D. 251, 253 (D. 
Md. 2008). 
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by defendants in their privilege review.537  The review used seventy 
keywords which were selected by one of the defendants and his 
attorneys.538  According to the court, defendants were “regrettably vague” 
in describing how the keywords were developed, “how the search was 
conducted, and what quality controls were employed to assess their 
reliability and accuracy.”539  In particular, the court noted “nothing [was] 
known . . . regarding [defendant’s and his attorneys’] qualifications for 
designing a search and information retrieval strategy that could be 
expected to produce an effective and reliable privilege review.”540 
 
[123] The court further criticized defendants for not conducting any 
sampling to “see if the search results were reliable.”541  According to the 
court, the “only prudent way to test the reliability of the keyword search is 
to perform some appropriate sampling of the documents determined to be 
privileged and those determined not to be in order to arrive at a comfort 
level that the categories are neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.”542  
                                                 
537 See id. at 253-54, 256. 
 
538 Id. at 256. 
 
539 Id. 
 
540 Id.   
 
541 Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 257.  Instead, defendants apparently simply produced 
all documents identified by the keyword search as non-privileged.  Id.  
 
542 Id.  According to the court, “[c]ommon sense suggests that even a properly designed 
and executed keyword search may prove to be over-inclusive or under-inclusive, 
resulting in the identification of documents as privileged which are not, and non-
privileged which, in fact, are.”  Id.  In CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., No. 
1:07-CV-1822-TWT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84189, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2008), 102 
search terms resulted in 1.4 million responsive documents.  500,000 of the documents 
were “potentially privileged.”  Id. at *10.  After determining that plaintiff bore 
responsibility for selecting the search terms, the court ordered cost-shifting of $300,000 
to pay defendant’s costs in conducting the privilege review.  Id. at *8, *10.  In addition, 
the court awarded defendant attorney’s fees of $86,786.95 related to the motion to 
compel.  Id. at *12. 
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This failure to sample provided further support for the conclusion that 
defendants’ search efforts were not adequate.543 
 
[124] Discussing search protocols generally, the court acknowledged that 
while “keyword searches are useful tools for search and retrieval of ESI, 
all keyword searches are not created equal . . . .”544  Instead, “there is a 
growing body of literature that highlights the risks associated with 
conducting an unreliable or inadequate keyword search or relying 
exclusively on such searches for privilege review.”545  Citing O’Keefe and 
Equity Analytics, the court reasoned that “proper selection and 
implementation [of search terms] obviously involves technical, if not 
                                                 
543 See Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 262. 
 
544 Id. at 256-57.  Indeed, the court noted “[k]eyword searching may be accomplished in 
many ways,” ranging from simple use of “individual keywords . . . . [to] more advanced 
search techniques, such as Boolean proximity operators . . . .”  Id. at 261 n.9.  Boolean 
operators combine a keyword with phrases such as “or,” “and,” or “not” to locate 
responsive documents.  Id.  Beyond keywords are more advanced methods such as: 
  
probabilistic search models, including ‘Bayesian classifiers’ (which 
searches by creating a formula based on values assigned to particular 
words based on their interrelationships, proximity, and frequency to 
establish a relevancy ranking that is applied to each document 
searched); ‘Fuzzy Search Models’ (which attempt to refine a search 
beyond specific words, recognizing that words can have multiple 
forms.  By identifying the ‘core’ for a word the fuzzy search can 
retrieve documents containing all forms of the target word); 
‘Clustering’ searches (searches of documents by grouping them by 
similarity of content, for example, the presence of a series of same or 
similar words that are found in multiple documents); and ‘Concept and 
Categorization Tools’ (search systems that rely on a thesaurus to 
capture documents which use alternative ways to express the same 
thought). 
 
Id. 
 
545 Id. at 257. 
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scientific knowledge.”546  While acknowledging that those opinions had 
“raised the eyebrows of some commentators” who feared that the use of 
experts would multiply already exorbitant e-discovery costs, the court 
stated that a “careful reading of O’Keefe and Equity Analytics . . . should 
allay these concerns.”547   
 
[125] According to the court,  
 
It cannot credibly be denied that resolving contested issues 
of whether a particular search and information retrieval 
method was appropriate . . . involves scientific, technical or 
specialized information.  If so, then, the trial judge must 
decide a method’s appropriateness with the benefit of 
information from some reliable source—whether an 
affidavit from a qualified expert, a learned treatise, or, if 
appropriate, from information judicially noticed.548   
 
Indeed, the court termed it “risky for a trial judge to attempt to resolve 
issues involving technical areas without the aid of expert assistance.”549  
Thus, in the court’s view,  
 
all that O’Keefe and Equity Analytics required was that the 
parties be prepared to back up their positions with respect 
to a dispute involving the appropriateness of ESI search 
and information retrieval methodology—obviously an area 
of science or technology—with reliable information from 
                                                 
546 Id. at 260; see also In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 660 n.6, 662 
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (criticizing defendant’s use of keyword search methodology); Sedona 
Best Practices Commentary, supra note 517, at 201 (“[S]imple keyword searching alone 
is inadequate in at least some discovery contexts.”). 
 
547 Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 261 n.10. 
 
548 Id.   
 
549 Id. 
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someone with the qualifications to provide helpful 
opinions, not conclusory argument by counsel.550 
 
[126] Attempting to address the cost concerns mentioned previously, the 
court simply  
 
repeat[ed] that the cost-benefit balancing factors of . . . 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) apply to all aspects of discovery, and 
parties worried about the cost of employing properly 
designed search and information retrieval methods have an 
incentive to keep the costs of this phase of discovery as low 
as possible, including attempting to confer with their 
opposing party in an effort to identify a mutually agreeable 
search and retrieval method.551   
 
Such an agreement would minimize “cost because if the method is 
approved, there will be no dispute resolving its sufficiency, and doing it 
right the first time is always cheaper than doing it over if ordered to do so 
by the court.”552  Needless to say, this discussion does nothing to “allay” 
the cost concerns occasioned by the O’Keefe and Equity Analytics 
decisions.553  On the contrary, it appears to cement those concerns.  The 
court’s reference to an “incentive” to keep discovery costs low fails to 
recognize that quite often there is only one party with such an incentive—
its opponent wants the opposite.554  Whether requiring agreement to 
                                                 
550 Id. 
 
551 Id. 
 
552 Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 261 n.10. 
 
553 See id. 
 
554 See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 848-49 (7th Cir. 2010).  
Likewise, courts and commentators considered the proportionality analysis commended 
by this court to be ineffective under the pre-amendment version of the Rules.  See supra 
note 269, and accompanying text.  It is far from clear that the amended Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)’s cost-benefit test is any more effective than the previous version.  See Duke: 
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overly broad search terms the opponent wants, or hiring an expert to 
justify more constrained terms, this line of cases, if followed, simply adds 
yet another layer of costs to the e-discovery process.555 
 
4. William A. Gross 
 
[127] In William A. Gross Construction Associates, Inc. v. American 
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., the court issued a “wake-up call to 
the Bar . . . about the need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and 
cooperation with opposing counsel in designing search terms or 
‘keywords’ to be used to produce e-mails or other [ESI].”556  The dispute 
centered on the production of e-mails from a non-party to the suit.557  The 
parties could not agree on keywords, with each side proposing terms the 
other party considered either too narrow or too broad.558  As a result, the 
court was “left . . . in the uncomfortable position of having to craft a 
keyword search methodology for the parties, without adequate information 
. . . .”559  Concluding that the case was just the latest example of lawyers 
designing keyword searches in the dark, the court joined the O’Keefe line 
of cases in requiring that search methodology be supported by “something 
                                                                                                                         
Providing Tools to Cope with E-Discovery Issues, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., 
June 2, 2010, at 12  (noting consensus that proportionality standard “is not used very 
often, if at all”). 
 
555 See, e.g., Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 849-50. 
 
556 William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 
557 Id. 
 
558 Id. at 135.  The court noted the “problem would have been avoided . . . if [the non-
party] used a standard ‘Re’ line in its . . . e-mails to distinguish [the relevant] project from 
its other work.  It did not do so, however.”  Id.  It may bear mentioning that businesses 
use e-mail to conduct business, not prepare for discovery obligations in some future, 
unanticipated litigation years hence.   
 
559 Id. 
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other than a lawyer’s guesses . . . without any quality control testing to see 
if the search terms produce reasonably all the responsive ESI and limited 
‘false positives.’”560  Summing up, the court endorsed “cooperation 
among counsel” as the “best solution in the entire area of electronic 
discovery . . . .”561  Again, whether this is a realistic solution is far from 
clear.   
          
5. Fannie Mae 
 
[128] In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation illustrates the potential 
pitfalls of cooperation: a third party responding to a subpoena spent 
millions of dollars for failing to conduct timely searches on overly broad 
but agreed-to key words, and the court still held the party in contempt.562  
The third party’s initial response to the subpoena did not include searching 
backup tapes.563  When the requesting parties objected and moved to hold 
the third party in contempt, the third party agreed to search its backup 
tapes; the parties memorialized this agreement in a stipulated order.564  
Pursuant to this agreement, the requesting parties submitted over 400 
search terms which implicated approximately 660,000 documents.565  The 
                                                 
560 Id. at 136 n.3.  Surprisingly, the court held that it “need not now decide whether expert 
testimony is required” to validate a search.  Id. 
 
561 William A. Gross, 256 F.R.D. at 136 n.3; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, 
LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (involving an agreement between parties on 
nine search terms, but requiring court to resolve dispute as to other thirty). 
 
562 In re Fannie Mae Secs. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  The third party, 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”), regulates the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”).  Id. at 816.  During litigation over alleged accounting 
irregularities by Fannie Mae, several of its senior executives issued subpoenas to 
OFHEO.  Id.   
 
563 Id. at 817. 
 
564 Id. 
 
565 Id. 
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third party objected, claiming that under the agreement the requesting 
parties were limited to providing “appropriate search terms.”566  The 
district court disagreed, however, ruling that the agreement567 “gave the 
[requesting parties] sole discretion to specify search terms and imposed no 
limits on permissible terms.”568  The third party then took “extensive 
efforts to comply” with its production obligations under the agreement, 
“hiring fifty contract attorneys solely for that purpose” and spending “over 
$6 million, more than 9 percent of the agency’s entire annual budget.”569  
Nevertheless, the third party was not able to comply in a timely manner 
with its production deadlines, leading the district court to hold it in 
contempt.570 
 
[129] On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the lower court 
that the agreement obligated the third party to use whatever search terms 
the requesting parties specified.571  The appellate court likewise rejected 
the argument that “the district court violated Rule 45 by compelling 
compliance without considering cost-shifting, narrowing the scope of the 
requests, or finding that [the requesting parties] demonstrated good cause 
for forcing [the third party] to retrieve its inaccessible data.”572  According 
to the court, “[w]hatever the merits of these claims, [the third party] 
                                                 
566 Id.  
 
567 The specific terms at issue provided that “OFHEO will work with the [requesting 
parties] to provide the necessary information (without individual document review) to 
develop appropriate search terms.  By October 19, 2007, the [requesting parties] will 
specify the search terms to be used.”  In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d at 817. 
 
568 Id.      
 
569 Id. 
 
570 Id. at 818.  As a sanction, the district court ordered production of all documents 
withheld on the sole basis of the qualified deliberative process privilege and not logged 
by a certain deadline.  Id. 
 
571 Id. at 819. 
 
572 In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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abandoned them by entering into the stipulated order.”573  Thus, in the 
court’s view the third party could “hardly complain now about being held 
to its agreement.”574       
 
E. Form of Production—Metadata, etc. 
 
1. Scotts 
 
[130] In Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., plaintiff sought 
an order requiring defendant to reproduce certain electronic data, 
including metadata, “in the form in which it was maintained by defendant 
instead of in the hard copy form in which it ha[d] been produced . . . .”575  
                                                 
573 Id. at 821-22. 
 
574 Id. at 822.  Of course, the major point in dispute was whether the third party agreed to 
the undeniably overbroad and unduly burdensome search terms.  Thus, under these 
circumstances it is not particularly persuasive to conclude that the third party had no 
grounds to complain about the scope of the subpoena because it agreed to it.  This is 
especially so given that Rule 45 mandates that a “party or attorney responsible for issuing 
and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or 
expense on a person subject to the subpoena.  The issuing court must enforce this duty . . 
. .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).  Indeed, as Magistrate Grimm explained in Mancia v. 
Mayflower Textile Services Co., the court has a sua sponte obligation to limit discovery 
where the burden or expense outweighs the likely benefit. 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 
2008); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1); supra text 
accompanying notes 485-97.  Spending $6 million and over 9 percent of an annual 
budget responding to a subpoena would certainly seem to be an undue burden and 
expense, no matter the alleged terms of agreement.  Thus, if anything, In re Fannie Mae 
provides yet another example of the difficulty of relying on the proportionality concepts 
of the Federal Rules to effectively limit the scope or expense of e-discovery.   
 
575 Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43005, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007).  The court examined several sources to define 
“metadata,” and settled on a few.  Id.  It is “commonly described as ‘data about data,’ is 
defined as a ‘set of data that describes and gives information about other data.’”  Id. at 
*11 n.2 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY).  The Sedona Conference defines 
metadata as “information about a particular data set which describes how, when and by 
whom it was collected, created, accessed, or modified and how it is formatted (including 
data demographics such as size, location, storage requirements and media information).”  
Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *11 n.2 (quoting THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: 
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Plaintiff argued that “as a ‘matter of law, a party’s discovery obligations 
are not satisfied by the production of computerized information in a hard 
copy format.’”576   
 
[131] Citing Rule 34, however, the court concluded this “assertion is 
simply an incorrect statement of the law.”577  Rather, the court noted that 
under Rule 34 both parties play a role in the form of production.578  That 
is, a party may specify the form in which it wants the ESI produced; 
plaintiff, however, had failed to do so in its requests.579  Likewise, in its 
responses defendant had not specified the form it intended to use for its 
production, as required under Rule 34 when the propounding party does 
not specify the form.580  Relying on the Advisory Committee Notes to the 
2006 amendments, the court recognized that if “the responding party 
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it 
searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in 
                                                                                                                         
BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION AND 
RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE, at Appendix F (Charles R. Ragan et. al eds., 2005), 
available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf).  
Common examples of metadata include:  “a file’s name, a file’s location (e.g., directory 
structure or pathname), file format or file type, file size, file dates (e.g., creation date, 
date of last data modification, date of last data access, and date of last metadata 
modification), and file permissions (e.g., who can read the data, who can write to it, who 
can run it).”  Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *11 n.2.  File dates and size can 
often be seen by users, but “other metadata can be hidden or embedded and unavailable 
to computer users who are not technically adept.”  Id.; see Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. 
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 
230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005)).   
 
576 Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *13.   
 
577 Id. 
 
578 Id. 
 
579 Id. at *12. 
 
580 Id. 
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a form that removes or significantly degrades this feature.”581  While 
plaintiff argued the hard copy production impaired its ability to use the 
information by not permitting searches for metadata, the court concluded 
the parties should meet and confer on this issue.582 
 
2. Ford 
 
[132] In Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties, Inc., the defendant 
requested that plaintiff “produce documents in native format.”583  In 
response, the plaintiff produced documents in “Tagged Image File Format 
(‘TIFF’) with accompanying searchable text.” 584  After plaintiff 
essentially completed the production, defendant objected to the form.585 
 
[133] According to the court, the “producing party ordinarily must take 
into account the need for metadata to make otherwise unintelligible 
documents understandable.”586  But, “crucially” in the court’s view, 
defendant did not object to the production “within a reasonable period of 
time. . . .”587  While the court did not “dictat[e] a rigid formulation as to 
when a party must object to a document production,” it simply held that 
waiting until after the production was “virtually complete” was 
                                                 
581 Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *14. 
 
582 Id. at *14-15. 
 
583 Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 
584 Id.   
 
585 Id. at 425-26. 
 
586 Id. at 425; see also Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of the 
United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that 
metadata is generally ordered produced when “it is sought in the initial document request 
and the producing party has not yet produced the documents in any form”); THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at ii (see Principle 12).  
 
587 Ford, 257 F.R.D. at 425. 
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unreasonable.588  Because defendant had waived its objection, and it 
“without question [would be] unduly burdensome to a party months after 
production to require that party to reconstitute their entire production to 
appease a late objection,” the court denied the motion to compel.589 
 
3. Covad 
 
[134] In Covad Communications Co. v. Revonet, Inc., the defendant 
refused to produce e-mails in their native format, instead proposing to 
make them available in hard copy or TIFF files.590  That is, defendant 
“claim[ed] the right to convert the e-mails from their native format to 
other formats even though those are not as easily searchable by electronic 
means as the e-mails in their native format would be.”591  Defendant’s 
justification for doing so was that plaintiff had not specified the format for 
the production of the e-mails.592   
 
[135] Pursuant to Rule 34, the court noted “the requesting party may 
[specify] the form in which [ESI] should be produced and,” failing that, 
the production should be in the “form in which [the information] is 
ordinarily maintained, or in a reasonably usable form.”593  The parties had 
                                                 
588 Id. at 426.  The court commended “[r]easonableness [a]s the touchstone principle, as it 
is with most discovery obligations.”  Id. 
 
589 Id.  The court noted the “entire problem could have been avoided had there been an 
explicit agreement between the parties as to production, but . . . that ship ha[d] sailed . . . 
.”  Id. 
 
590 Covad Commc’ns. Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 147, 148 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 
591 Id. 
 
592 See id. at 148-49. 
 
593 Id. at 149; see also MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., No. 06-2318-JWL-DJW, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76853, at *9-10 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2007) (noting that “the producing 
party must either produce the documents as they are kept in the usual course of business 
or organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request” and that “[i]f 
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not discussed what form the production would take, but instead appeared 
to “mak[e] assumptions based on each others’ behavior: [plaintiff] 
expect[ed] its documents in electronic form because [defendant] hired a 
company to collect [ESI], and [defendant] assum[ed] that they should 
produce 35,000 pages of e-mails in hard copy because [plaintiff] produced 
its documents in that format.”594  While recognizing that plaintiff’s 
instructions in the document requests were “hopelessly imprecise and 
[defendant] could colorably argue that [they] should be interpreted to 
include several different formats,” the court concluded that “no reasonable 
person can honestly believe that hard copy is one of them.”595  Indeed, 
according to the court, while it was unclear what plaintiff asked for, it was 
clear what they had not asked for, “and that is what they got.”596  Thus, the 
court ordered that defendant “produce the e-mails . . . in their native 
format.”597 
 
[136] The court went on to conclude that the parties should share the cost 
of removing any privileged e-mails from the production up to $4,000, i.e., 
$2,000 per party.598  While ordinarily defendant would bear this cost 
                                                                                                                         
the producing party produces documents [in order] . . . the Rule imposes no duty to 
organize and label the documents . . .”). 
 
594 Covad, 254 F.R.D. at 149. 
 
595 Id. at 150.   
 
596 Id. 
 
597 Id. at 151.  In doing so, the court noted there was authority from “at least 2000 that 
indicated that a party could be required to produce data in an electronic format even 
though it had already produced it in hard copy.”  Id. at 150-51 (citing Shira A. Scheindlin 
& Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the 
Task?, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 327, 355 (2000)).  Thus, according to the court, defendant “played 
with fire” by producing the e-mails only in hard copy.  Id. at 151.  But the court did not 
mention Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii)’s provision that a “party need not produce the same [ESI] 
in more than one form.”  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). 
 
598 Covad, 254 F.R.D. at 151. 
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alone, the court recognized that plaintiff had “play[ed] with the same fire” 
by likewise producing its documents in hard copy.599  Thus, characterizing 
the dispute as “both parties [going] through the same stop sign,” the court 
concluded “that they both should pay for the crash.”600  Indeed, the court 
hoped its decision would “have a didactic purpose” by emphasizing the 
need for parties to confer with each other “on such a fundamental question 
as the format of their productions of [ESI].”601         
 
4. Dahl 
 
[137] In Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, plaintiffs sought 
production of all the “metadata associated with e-mails and word 
documents produced” by defendants.602  The court, however, rejected this 
request, noting that “case law shows wariness about metadata’s value in 
litigation.”603  Indeed, according to the court, “Rule 34 militates against 
the broad, open disclosure of metadata that” plaintiffs sought.604  Instead, 
the court explained that discovery requests should be narrowly tailored “so 
only necessary data is produced.”605  Applying this principle, the court 
                                                 
599 Id.; see also Peskoff v. Faber, 251 F.R.D. 59, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2008) (examining cost-
shifting when the information sought could only be obtained through a costly forensic 
examination). 
 
600 Covad, 254 F.R.D. at 151. 
 
601 Id. 
 
602 Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 
603 Id.; see, e.g., Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc., No. 05-138-WOB, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92028, at *24 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006) (“In most cases and for most 
documents, metadata does not provide relevant information”); Wyeth v. Impax Labs., 
Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006) (“Most metadata is of limited evidentiary value, 
and reviewing it can waste litigation resources”). 
 
604 Dahl, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 149. 
 
605 Id. at 150. 
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concluded that “[r]ather than a sweeping request for metadata, [plaintiffs] 
should tailor their requests to specific word documents, specific e-mails or 
specific sets of e-mail . . . .”606  The court hoped this “more focused 
approach [would] . . . reduce the parties’ costs and work.”607    
 
F. Significant Recent Sanctions Cases 
 
1. Zubulake Revisited—Pension Committee 
 
[138] In Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan 
v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, Judge Scheindlin revisited the 
preservation principles she initially set forth in the Zubulake series of 
opinions six years earlier.608  Certain defendants moved for sanctions, 
arguing “plaintiff[s] failed to preserve . . . [relevant] documents” and then 
                                                 
606 Id.; see also Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, LLC, No. CV608-096, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 66238, at *11 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2009) (ordering production of metadata where 
plaintiffs showed “particularized need for the information”); cf. Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. 
LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 568, 582-83, 590-91 (M.D. Fla. 2009) 
(sanctioning plaintiff and counsel for falsely telling opposing counsel that plaintiff “had 
caused all of its  ESI to be printed and scanned to support the position that [plaintiff] 
could not produce metadata or text searchable documents”); Williams v. Sprint/United 
Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (clarifying that order to produce ESI “in 
the form in which it is regularly maintained, i.e., in its native format or as an active file, . 
. . must include all metadata unless . . . party timely objects to production of the metadata, 
the parties agree that the metadata should not be produced, or the producing party 
requests a protective order.”).  
 
607 Dahl, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 150.  The court did require that certain excel spreadsheets be 
produced in their native format, drawing a distinction with metadata “because of [their] 
different functions . . . .”  Id. at n.1.  According to the court, “[m]aintaining spreadsheets 
in their native format is necessary to assure the integral elements of a spreadsheet remain 
undisturbed.  In contrast, the court [was] not convinced that metadata is an integral 
element of a given e-mail or word document.”  Id.  
 
608 Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Once again, I have been compelled to 
closely review the discovery efforts of parties in a litigation, and once again have found 
that those efforts were flawed.”). 
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“submitted false and misleading declarations regarding their” discovery 
efforts.609  While acknowledging that “[c]ourts cannot and do not expect 
that any party can meet a standard of perfection,” the court explained that 
it has “a right to expect that litigants and counsel will take the necessary 
steps to ensure that relevant records are preserved when litigation is 
reasonably anticipated, and that such records are collected, reviewed, and 
produced to the opposing party.”610  Further, according to the court, 
“[e]ach case will turn on its own facts and the varieties of efforts and 
failures is [sic] infinite.”611   
 
[139] Informing the court’s analysis were the principles of negligence, 
gross negligence, and willfulness.612  Finding “no clear definition of these 
terms” applicable to spoliation allegations, the court concluded they 
“simply describe a continuum.  Conduct is either acceptable or 
unacceptable.  Once it is unacceptable the only question is how bad is the 
conduct.”613   The court reasoned that after July 2004, when Zubulake V 
was issued, the “failure to issue a written litigation hold constitutes gross 
negligence because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of 
relevant information.”614 
 
                                                 
609 Id. at 463.  Plaintiffs were ninety-six investors seeking to recover $550 million lost 
when two hedge funds were liquidated.  Id. at 462 n.3.  The retention efforts of thirteen of 
the plaintiffs were at issue in the motion.  Id.  
 
610 Id. at 461. 
 
611 Id. at 465. 
 
612 Id. at 463. 
 
613 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 463. 
 
614 Id. at 464; cf. Haynes v. Dart, No. 08-C-4834, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1901, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010)  (“The failure to institute a document retention policy, in the 
form of a litigation hold, is relevant to the court’s consideration, but it is not per se 
evidence of sanctionable conduct.”). 
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[140] Turning to the next step of collection and review, the court noted 
that “depending on the extent of the failure to collect evidence, or the 
sloppiness of the review, the resulting loss or destruction of evidence is 
surely negligent, and, depending on the circumstances may be grossly 
negligent or willful.”615  Thus, for example, the “failure to collect 
records—either paper or electronic—from key players constitutes gross 
negligence or willfulness as does the destruction of e-mail or certain 
backup tapes after the duty to preserve has attached.”616  On the other 
hand, the “failure to obtain records from all those employees who had any 
involvement with the issues raised in the litigation . . ., as opposed to just 
the key players, could constitute negligence.”617 
 
[141] Whether alleged misconduct constitutes negligence versus gross 
negligence or worse is significant because the answer impacts how the 
party seeking sanctions goes about proving the relevance of the missing 
evidence.618  Significantly, according to the court, “[r]elevance and 
prejudice may be presumed when the spoliating party acted in bad faith or 
                                                 
615 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
 
616 Id.  The court later clarified that by mentioning “certain backup tapes” it was not 
“requiring that all backup tapes must be preserved.  Rather, if such tapes are the sole 
source of relevant information (e.g., the active files of key players are no longer 
available), then such backup tapes should be segregated and preserved.  When accessible 
data satisfies the requirement to search for and produce relevant information, there is no 
need to save or search backup tapes.”  Id. at 479 n.99.  This limitation comports with the 
court’s earlier guidance in Zubulake IV and the holdings of other cases.  See Oxford 
House, Inc. v. Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *12 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 27, 2007); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“As a general rule, 
then, a party need not preserve all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates 
litigation.”). 
 
617 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
 
618 See id. at 467.  To win sanctions, the movant must establish that the alleged spoliator: 
“(1) had control over the evidence and an obligation to preserve it at the time of 
destruction or loss; (2) acted with a culpable state of mind upon destroying or losing the 
evidence; and that (3) the missing evidence is relevant to the innocent party’s claim or 
defense.”  Id.  
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in a grossly negligent manner.”619  On the contrary, “when the spoliating 
party was merely negligent, the innocent party must prove both relevance 
and prejudice in order to justify the imposition of a severe sanction.”620  
Relevance in this regard “means something more than sufficiently 
probative to satisfy Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”621  Thus, 
the “innocent party must . . . show that the evidence would have been 
helpful in proving its claims or defenses — i.e., that the innocent party is 
prejudiced without that evidence.”622  Significantly, “[p]roof of relevance 
does not necessarily equal proof of prejudice.”623   
 
[142] Applying these principles, the court rejected the defendant’s 
request for a dismissal, “the most extreme sanction.”624  The court did, 
                                                 
619 Id.  But “application of the presumption is not required.”  Id.  Further, “[n]o matter 
what level of culpability is found, any presumption is rebuttable and the spoliating party 
should have the opportunity to demonstrate that the innocent party has not been 
prejudiced by the absence of the missing information.”  Id. at 468.  Indeed, the “party 
seeking relief has some obligation to make a showing of relevance and eventually 
prejudice, lest litigation become a ‘gotcha’ game rather than a full and fair opportunity to 
air the merits of a dispute.”  Id.  
 
620 Id. at 467-68. 
 
621 Id. at 467 (citation omitted). 
 
622 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467.  This, of course, can be a difficult burden 
because it is “often impossible to know what lost documents would have contained.”  Id. 
at 466.  Thus, “[c]ourts must take care not to ‘hold[] the prejudiced party to too strict a 
standard of proof regarding the likely contents of the destroyed [or unavailable] 
evidence,’ because doing so ‘would . . . allow parties who have . . . destroyed evidence to 
profit from that destruction.’”  Id. at 468 (alteration in original).  Nevertheless, the 
innocent party “must present extrinsic evidence tending to show that the destroyed [ESI] 
would have been favorable to [its] case.”  Id. 
 
623 Id. at 467. 
 
624 Id. at 469.  As the court noted, a “terminating sanction is justified in only the most 
egregious cases, such as where a party has engaged in perjury, tampering with evidence, 
or intentionally destroying evidence by burning, shredding, or wiping out computer hard 
drives.”  Id. at 469-70; see, e.g., Gutman v. Klein, No. 03 Civ. 1570 (BMC), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 97707, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2008) (granting default judgment where 
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however, conclude that plaintiffs failed to issue an appropriate litigation 
hold when their duty to preserve arose.625  While acknowledging that 
counsel had “telephoned and e-mailed plaintiffs [regarding preserving and 
collecting documents] and distributed memoranda instructing plaintiffs to 
be over, rather than under, inclusive,” the court noted the purported hold 
did “not direct employees to preserve all relevant records—both paper and 
electronic—nor [did] it create a mechanism for collecting the preserved 
records so that they [could] be searched by someone other than the 
employee.”626  Rather, according to the court, the “directive place[d] total 
reliance on the employee to search and select what that employee believed 
to be responsive records without any supervision from [c]ounsel.”627 
 
[143] The court concluded that none of the plaintiffs “engaged in willful 
misconduct.”628  But,—separate and apart from failing to issue an 
appropriate litigation hold—the court found numerous other instances of 
either gross negligence or simple negligence by plaintiffs.629  Specifically, 
certain plaintiffs “failed to execute a comprehensive search for documents 
and/or failed to sufficiently supervise or monitor their employees’ 
                                                                                                                         
defendants intentionally deleted computer files after duty to preserve arose).  The court 
found “no evidence of such misconduct in this case.”  Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 
470. 
 
625 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 473.  Indeed, plaintiffs admitted that they did not 
issue written litigation holds until 2007, whereas their duty to preserve arose in 2003.  Id. 
at 475-76. 
 
626 Id. at 473. 
 
627 Id.  In the court’s view, “not every employee will require hands-on supervision from 
an attorney.  However, attorney oversight of the [preservation] process, including the 
ability to review, sample, or spot-check the collection efforts is important.”  Id. n.68.  
Again, the court noted “each search must be evaluated on a case by case basis.”  Id. 
 
628 Id. at 478. 
 
629 Id. at 477. 
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document collection.”630  Other plaintiffs “failed to collect and preserve 
documents of key players.”631  At least one plaintiff “admitted that it 
destroyed backup data in 2004, after the duty to preserve at least some 
backup tapes was well-established.”632  Finally, the court noted that 
“almost every plaintiff submitted a declaration [detailing their preservation 
efforts] that—at best—lacked attention to detail, or—at worst—was 
intentionally vague in an attempt to mislead . . . [d]efendants and the 
[c]ourt.”633 
 
[144] On the issue of remedy, the court found that for those plaintiffs 
who were grossly negligent, defendants had “‘adduced enough evidence’ 
that plaintiffs ha[d] failed to produce relevant documents and that the . . . 
[d]efendants ha[d] been prejudiced as a result.”634  Accordingly, the court 
agreed to instruct the jury that it could presume “both the relevance of the 
missing documents and resulting prejudice to the . . . [d]efendants, subject 
to the plaintiffs’ ability to rebut the presumption . . . .”635   
 
[145] For the remaining plaintiffs, who were merely negligent in 
carrying out their discovery obligations, the court concluded that 
defendants “carried their limited burden of demonstrating that the lost 
                                                 
630 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
 
631 Id.   
 
632 Id. 
 
633 Id. at 477.  In addition, the court concluded several plaintiffs violated their duty to 
present knowledgeable witnesses regarding “[w]hich files were searched, how the search 
was conducted, who was asked to search, what they were told, and the extent of any 
supervision . . . .”  Id. 
 
634 Id. at 478. 
 
635 Pension Comm., 658 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
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documents would have been relevant.”636  However, the court determined 
prejudice to be “another matter,” recognizing that defendants had 
“gathered an enormous amount of discovery—both from documents and 
witnesses.”637  Thus, the court found that a sanction less than an adverse 
inference would suffice for the negligent plaintiffs “[u]nless [defendants] 
[could] show through extrinsic evidence that the loss of the documents has 
prejudiced their ability to defend the case.”638  The court therefore ruled 
the negligent plaintiffs were subject only to monetary sanctions, including 
the defendant’s reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in 
prosecuting the motion.639  The grossly negligent plaintiffs were subject to 
this monetary sanction in addition to the adverse inference charge.640 
 
2. Rimkus 
 
[146] In contrast to Pension Committee, the court in Rimkus Consulting 
Group, Inc. v. Cammarata addressed allegations of intentional, rather than 
negligent, destruction of evidence,641 in the context of a dispute regarding 
covenants not to compete.642  Defendants acknowledged they had deleted 
                                                 
636 Id. at 479.  Here, the court reasoned that “[t]he documents that no longer exist were 
created during the critical time period.  Key players must have engaged in 
correspondence regarding the relevant transactions.”  Id.  
 
637 Id. 
 
638 Id. 
 
639 Id. at 497. 
 
640 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.251, 497. 
 
641 Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex. 
2010) (“[A]llegations of willful misconduct: the intentional destruction of e-mails and 
other electronic information at a time when they were known to be relevant to anticipated 
or pending litigation.”). 
 
642 Plaintiff alleged that defendants—its former employees—breached noncompetition 
and nonsolicitation agreements and misappropriated trade secrets in launching a new 
competing business.  Id. at 608. 
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“some arguably relevant” e-mails, but contended plaintiff could not “show 
prejudice because the missing e-mails ‘would be merely cumulative of the 
evidence already produced.’”643 
 
[147] In discussing the applicable legal principles, the court noted that 
“[w]hether preservation or discovery conduct is acceptable in a case 
depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn depends on whether what 
was done—or not done—was proportional to that case and consistent with 
clearly established applicable standards.”644  As the Pension Committee 
court recognized, this “analysis depends heavily on the facts and 
circumstances of each case and cannot be reduced to a generalized 
checklist.”645  This is because in assessing sanctions a court must 
“consider both the spoliating party’s culpability and the level of prejudice 
to the party seeking the discovery,” both of which “can range along a 
continuum.”646  Thus, a “court’s response to the loss of evidence depends 
on both the degree of culpability and the extent of prejudice.”647  So, for 
example, “[e]ven if there is intentional destruction of potentially relevant 
evidence, if there is no prejudice to the opposing party, that influences the 
sanctions” ruling.648 
 
                                                 
643 Id. at 609.  Indeed, the record “include[d] evidence that the defendants intentionally 
deleted some e-mails and attachments after there was a duty to preserve them . . . . [and 
engaged in] efforts to conceal or delay revealing that e-mails and attachments had been 
deleted.”  Id. at 607. 
 
644 Id. at 613. 
 
645 Id. (citing Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65).  Likewise, according to the 
Rimkus court, “[a]pplying a categorical approach to sanctions issues is also difficult.”  Id. 
 
646 Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
 
647 Id. 
 
648 Id.  Similarly, “if there is an inadvertent loss of evidence but severe prejudice to the 
opposing party, that . . . will influence the appropriate response, recognizing that 
sanctions (as opposed to other remedial steps) require some degree of culpability.”  Id.   
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 113 
[148] Applying Fifth Circuit law, the court noted that “severe sanctions,” 
such as “granting default judgment, striking pleadings, or giving adverse 
inference instructions may not be imposed unless there is evidence of ‘bad 
faith.’”649  That is, “‘[m]ere negligence is not enough’ to warrant an 
instruction on spoliation.’”650  Consequently, unlike in the Second Circuit, 
“negligent as opposed to intentional, ‘bad faith’ destruction of evidence is 
not sufficient to give an adverse inference instruction and may not relieve 
the party seeking discovery of the need to show that missing documents 
are relevant and their loss prejudicial.”651  According to the court, the Fifth 
Circuit’s emphasis on the “level of culpability necessary for an adverse 
inference instruction limit[ed] the applicability of the Pension Committee 
approach[,]” where Judge Scheindlin “imposed a form of adverse 
inference instruction based on a finding of gross negligence. . . .”652 
 
[149] Requiring a “showing that the lost information is relevant and 
prejudicial is an important check on spoliation allegations and sanctions 
motions.”653  Thus, “[c]ourts have held that speculative or generalized 
assertions that the missing evidence would have been favorable to the 
party seeking sanctions are insufficient.”654  Here, the court distinguished 
Pension Committee’s reasoning that because the evidence no longer exists 
                                                 
649 Id. at 614 (citations omitted). 
 
650 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
651 Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 615.  The court noted “[o]ther circuits have also held 
negligence insufficient for an adverse inference instruction.”  Id. at 614 (citations 
omitted) (listing Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits as requiring bad 
faith for adverse inference, while the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits do not).  
 
652 Id. at 615. 
 
653 Id. at 616.  The court recognized that “[s]poliation of evidence—particularly of 
[ESI]—has assumed a level of importance in litigation that raises grave concerns.  
Spoliation allegations and sanctions motions distract from the merits of a case, add costs 
to discovery, and delay resolution.”  Id. at 607. 
 
654 Id. at 616 (citations omitted). 
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it may be difficult for “an innocent party . . . to show that information lost 
through spoliation is relevant and prejudicial[,]”655 and Pension 
Committee’s conclusion allowing for the presumption of relevance and 
prejudice “when the spoliating party acts in a grossly negligent [rather 
than intentional] manner.”656  On the contrary, the Rimkus court 
recognized that “in many cases . . . there are sources from which at least 
some of the allegedly spoliated evidence can be obtained.”657  In addition, 
often the “party seeking discovery can also obtain extrinsic evidence of 
the content of at least some of the deleted information from other 
documents, deposition testimony, or circumstantial evidence.”658  In fact, 
that is what occurred in the case before the court, where evidence 
developed by the plaintiff “included some recovered deleted e-mails and 
circumstantial evidence and deposition testimony relating to the 
unrecovered records.”659  As a result, the court concluded there was 
                                                 
655 Id. 
 
656 Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (citation omitted).  One obvious conceptual problem 
with the Pension Committee approach is that typically a negligence analysis requires 
proof of harm, i.e., damages will not be presumed.  See, e.g., Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 
86, 89 n.5 (10th Cir. 1972) (“Actual damage is, of course, an essential element in a 
negligence action.  Here damages are not presumed.”); Catasauqua Area Sch. Dist. v. 
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., No. 85-3743, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 28, 1988).  But, although phrased in the guise of a traditional negligence 
framework, Pension Committee dispenses with the need to show harm by assuming 
relevance and prejudice if the spoliation resulted from gross negligence.  Pension Comm. 
of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 
467 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  And even with ordinary negligence, where Pension Committee 
would require proof of relevance and prejudice, the court took pains to stress that the 
burden of proof should not be “too strict.”  Id. at 468.  Again, this concept is not found in 
traditional negligence analysis.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A 
(1965) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving he “has in fact suffered harm 
of a kind legally compensable by damages.”).   
 
657 Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 616. 
 
658 Id. 
 
659 Id. at 617-18. 
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“neither a factual nor legal basis . . . to rely on a presumption of relevance 
or prejudice.”660  
 
[150] Because the court determined that plaintiffs had made the 
necessary preliminary showing of willful misconduct, it concluded that it 
would present an adverse inference instruction to the jury.661  The 
instruction would “ask the jury to decide whether the defendants 
intentionally deleted [ESI] to prevent [its] use in litigation” and, assuming 
such misconduct, “whether . . . the lost information would have been 
unfavorable to the defendants.”662  In addition, the court awarded plaintiff 
reasonable costs and fees incurred in investigating the spoliation and 
prosecuting the motion.663           
 
3. Victor Stanley II 
 
[151] In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley II), 
Magistrate Judge Grimm addressed a request for default judgment and 
other sanctions based on one defendant’s serial spoliation of ESI.664  
Defendants acquiesced in a partial default judgment, which the court 
granted.665  More notably, the court ordered that the spoliating defendant 
be imprisoned for no more than two years, “unless and until” he paid 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs awarded in connection with the 
motion.666  While acknowledging this was an “extreme sanction,” the 
                                                 
660 Id. at 618. 
 
661 Id. at 620. 
 
662 Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 620.   
 
663 Id. at 679. 
 
664 See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley II), 269 F.R.D. 497, 500 
(D. Md. 2010) (the party “deleted, destroyed, and otherwise failed to preserve evidence; 
and repeatedly misrepresented the completeness of their discovery production . . .”).  
 
665 Id. 
 
666 Id. 
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court reasoned this was an “extreme case,”667 calling the prejudice to 
plaintiff from the destruction “unquestionable.”668  Strikingly, the court 
termed it the “single most egregious example of spoliation that [it had] 
encountered. . . .”669 
 
[152] Victor Stanley II is instructive for its thorough exposition of the 
state of the law regarding e-discovery and spoliation.670  Initially, the court 
noted that resolving spoliation motions had “proven to be one of the most 
challenging tasks for judges,” particularly because of the  
 
lack of a uniform national standard governing when the 
duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence commences, 
the level of culpability required to justify sanctions, the 
nature and severity of appropriate sanctions, and the scope 
of the duty to preserve evidence and whether it is tempered 
by the same principles of proportionality that Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(2)(C) applies to all discovery in civil cases.671   
 
Further, the court recognized the concern that  
                                                 
667 Id. at 500 n.3.  Indeed, defendant not only failed to implement a litigation hold, he also 
actively deleted a large amount of relevant ESI.  Id. at 501, 504, 506. 
 
668 Id. at 508.  
 
669 Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 515.  According to the court, the record 
“demonstrate[d] intentional misconduct done with the purpose of concealing or 
destroying evidence.”  Id.  Further, the court concluded that this “grave misconduct . . . 
was undertaken for the purpose of thwarting [p]laintiff’s ability to prove its case and for 
the express purpose of hamstringing this Court’s ability to effect a just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution of a serious commercial tort” and that “[t]he prejudice to 
[p]laintiff [was] clear.”  Id. 
 
670 See generally id. at 497.  Judge Grimm even noted, “I will attempt to synthesize not 
only the law of this District and Circuit, but also to put it within the context of the state of 
the law in other circuits as well . . . .”  Id. at 517. 
 
671 Id. at 516. 
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in some instances, [courts] imposed standards approaching 
strict liability for loss of evidence, without adequately 
taking into account the difficulty—if not impossibility—of 
preserving all ESI that may be relevant to a lawsuit, the 
reasonableness of the measures that were taken to try to 
preserve relevant ESI, or whether the costs that would be 
incurred by more complete preservation would be 
disproportionately great when compared to what is at issue 
in the case.672 
 
As a result, according to the court, it was not an “exaggeration to say that 
many lawyers . . . view preservation obligations as one of the greatest 
contributors to the cost of litigation being disproportionately expensive in 
cases where ESI will play an evidentiary role.”673 
 
[153] Addressing the obligation to preserve evidence, the court noted 
that this duty “is neither absolute, nor intended to cripple organizations” 
and thus “should not be analyzed in absolute terms; it requires nuance, 
because the duty ‘cannot be defined with precision.’”674  According to the 
court, “[p]roper analysis requires . . . determin[ing] reasonableness under 
the circumstances—‘reasonable and good faith efforts to retain 
information that may be relevant to pending or threatened litigation.’”675  
Thus, “‘the scope of preservation should somehow be proportional to the 
amount in controversy and the costs and burdens of preservation.’”676  
This duty, of course, is further limited in that it “pertains only to relevant 
                                                 
672 Id.  
 
673 Id. 
 
674 Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 522 (citations omitted). 
 
675 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
676 Id. at 522 (citations omitted). 
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documents.”677  In sum, “assessment of reasonableness and proportionality 
should be at the forefront of all inquiries into whether a party has fulfilled 
its duty to preserve relevant evidence.”678 
 
[154] But “[u]nfortunately,” according to the court, “in terms of what a 
party must do to preserve potentially relevant evidence, case law is not 
consistent across the circuits, or even within individual districts.”679  This 
inconsistency concerns many litigants,  
 
particularly . . . institutional clients such as corporations, 
businesses or governments, because their activities—and 
vulnerability to being sued—often extend to multiple 
jurisdictions, yet they cannot look to any single standard to 
measure the appropriateness of their preservation activities, 
or their potential liability for failure to fulfill their 
preservation duties.680   
 
Reasonableness and proportionality thus should play a role here as well; 
that is, like the scope of the obligation to preserve, “[b]reach of the 
preservation duty . . . is [also] premised on reasonableness: A party 
                                                 
677 Id. (citing Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).   
 
678 Id. at 523.  But see Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the reasonableness and proportionality standard “may prove 
too amorphous to provide much comfort to a party deciding what files it may delete or 
backup tapes it may recycle”).  Thus, “[u]ntil a more precise definition is created by rule, 
a party is well-advised to ‘retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical 
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches.’”  Id. (quoting Zubulake IV, 
220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).  Significantly, “relevance” here “means relevance 
for purposes of discovery, which is ‘an extremely broad concept.’”  Id. at 436-37 
(quoting Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 
679 Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 523. 
 
680 Id. 
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breaches its duty to preserve relevant evidence if it fails to act reasonably 
by taking ‘positive action to preserve material evidence.’”681   
 
[155] Interestingly, the court identified the source of the preservation 
duty as being “owed to the court, not to a party’s adversary.”682  The court 
termed this “a subtle, but consequential”—indeed, some would say 
controversial—“distinction.”683  The court further noted a “proper 
appreciation of the distinction informs the . . . decision regarding 
appropriate spoliation sanctions.”684  For example,  
 
[w]here intentionally egregious conduct leads to spoliation 
of evidence but causes no prejudice because the evidence 
destroyed was not relevant, or was merely cumulative to 
readily available evidence, or because the same evidence 
could be obtained from other sources, then the integrity of 
the judicial system has been injured far less than if simple 
negligence results in the total loss of evidence essential for 
an adversary to prosecute or defend against a claim.685  
 
[156] From the premise that the parties owe the preservation duty to the 
court, the court noted “another, less widely discussed, injury to the civil 
                                                 
681 Id. at 525 (quoting Jones v. Bremen High Sch. Dist. 228, No. 08-C-3548, 2010 WL 
2106640, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2010)).  
 
682 Id.  This contention presents a couple of obvious conceptual problems.  First, left 
unexplained is how the adversary has standing to pursue sanctions for alleged spoliation 
if the duty to preserve is not actually owed to it.  Likewise, if the party truly owes a duty 
to the court—not the adversary—then resolving a spoliation motion would seem to put 
the court in an adversarial posture towards the party accused of spoliation, rather than 
functioning as an impartial decision maker.  
 
683 Id. at 526; see supra note 682. 
 
684 Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 526. 
 
685 Id. 
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justice system.”686  Specifically, “‘[w]hen spoliation issues are litigated, 
more attention is focused on e-discovery than on the merits, with a motion 
for sanctions an increasingly common filing.’”687  As a result, 
“[a]llegations of spoliation and the motions practice that ensues interfere 
with the court’s administration of justice in general by crowding its docket 
and delaying the resolution of cases.”688 
 
V.  CONCLUSION  
 
[157] Some five years after the amendments to the Federal Rules 
governing e-discovery, it is clear that they have not met the goals of 
promoting uniformity and achieving cost reduction.689  While the relevant 
Federal Rules are now uniform, their application varies widely, from when 
the duty of preservation attaches690 to what the duty encompasses,691 
                                                 
686 Id.  
 
687 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
688 Id. 
 
689 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the rules are meant to “secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action”); Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, at 
1. 
 
690 Compare Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 622 
(D. Colo. 2007) (finding that preservation duty arose when suit was filed), with Phillip M. 
Adams & Assocs., LLC v. Winbond Elecs. Corp., No. 1:05-CV-64, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97305, at *21 (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010) (finding that preservation duty arose years 
before suit was filed). 
 
691 Compare Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 522 (holding that reasonableness and 
proportionality should govern scope of preservation), with Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that reasonableness and 
proportionality may be too “amorphous” to rely upon, thus party should preserve all 
relevant documents).  Compare Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 
149 (D. Mass. 2009) (rejecting demand for metadata), with Williams v. Sprint/United 
Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (finding that production must include all 
relevant metadata unless parties agree otherwise). 
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including what actions the parties must take692 and the basis for any 
sanctions resulting from a failure to act.693  This lack of a national 
governing standard and the corresponding need for a case by case analysis 
leads parties to employ a lowest common denominator approach of 
essentially preserving everything, which obviously increases the costs of 
discovery.694  Thus, the most critical shortcoming of the amended Rules is 
their failure to restrain the exploding costs of e-discovery,695 despite 
recognition in the Rules themselves,696 and by some—but not 
enoughcourts, of the need to limit the inherent expense of such 
discovery.697  The results are predictable: parties simply do not bring cases 
because they fail a rational cost-benefit analysis or, the flip side, parties 
settle unmeritorious cases because it makes economic sense to do so rather 
                                                 
692 Compare Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a failure to issue a written 
litigation hold constitutes gross negligence), with Haynes v. Dart, No. 08-C-4834, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1901, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) (finding that a failure to issue 
litigation hold is not per se evidence of sanctionable conduct). 
 
693 Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (allowing for adverse inference 
based on gross negligence), with Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. 
Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (concluding that mere negligence, as opposed to 
intentional destruction, not sufficient to warrant adverse inference).  
 
694 See Orbit One, 271 F.R.D. at 436 (“Until a more precise definition is created by rule, a 
party is well-advised to ‘retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) 
in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches.’” (quoting Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 
212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003))). 
 
695 See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(noting “soar[ing]” costs related to e-discovery).  
 
696 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (allowing for cost-shifting); FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (proportionality standard). 
 
697 See supra note 554 and accompanying text.  Compare Mancia v. Mayflower Textile 
Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 2008) (noting court’s sua sponte duty to limit 
discovery where burden or expense outweighs likely benefit), with In re Fannie Mae Sec. 
Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding sanction related to overly broad 
search terms without reference to proportionality analysis).   
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                           Volume XVIII, Issue 3    
 
 122 
than fight on,698 all of which contributes to the “vanishing trial” 
phenomenon.699  These cost issues are only likely to get worse if the 
increased use of experts to validate search methodologies envisioned by 
the O’Keefe and Equity Analytics line of cases takes hold.700 
 
[158] Even with the default mode favoring over-preservation, the simple 
fact is that spoliation motions are now weapons.  Whatever is not 
preserved serves as the basis for a sanctions motion, regardless of 
relevance, prejudice, etc., and again increases litigation costs and slows 
dispute resolution.701  Given this reality, it seems clear that cooperation, 
whatever its general merits, is not likely to be a viable solution to the 
problems of e-discovery, particularly when the incentives—namely to run 
up costs in order to force a settlementdo not favor cooperation.702 
 
[159] Numerous groups have recognized the problems with e-discovery 
as it exists today, although solutions have been lacking.703  But until more 
                                                 
698 See Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364. 
 
699 See supra note 472 and accompanying text; see also Bace, supra note 9, at 2-3 
(quoting Justice Breyer that costs of e-discovery will “drive out of the litigation system a 
lot of people who ought to be there”). 
 
700 See supra notes 528-561 and accompanying text. 
 
701 See, e.g., Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. 487, 526 (D. Md. 2010); Rimkus Consulting 
Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 
702 See supra notes 491-92 and accompanying text; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (noting “in terrorem” increase in settlement value after 
surviving motion to dismiss due to discovery costs).  
 
703 See, e.g. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM 
/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008 (“Electronic discovery . . . needs a serious 
overhaul.”); SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM, PHASE ONE OCTOBER 
1, 2009 - MAY 1, 2010, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND PREPARATION OF PRINCIPLES 7 
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consistency and uniformity is brought to the application of the Rules 
(whether through further amendments or otherwise), unrestrained e-
discovery will continue to be a drag on the civil justice system. 
                                                                                                                         
(2009), available at http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/Statement%20-%20Phase%20One.pdf; 
Duke Law Hosts Conference on Litigation in Federal Courts, May 10-11, DUKE LAW 
NEWS, May 5, 2010, http://www.law.duke.edu/news/story?id =4933&u=11. 
